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$10 AND A DENIM JACKET? A MODEL




With confidence in the rarity of erroneous convictions, Judge
Learned Hand wrote:
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the
accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.'
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis;
J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School; J.S.M., Stanford Law School; J.D., Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis; M.S., University of Notre Dame; B.S., Rose-Hulman Institute of
Technology.
' United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). The preceding sentences
state "[u]nder our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.... He is immune
665
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Contrary to the eminent jurist's statement, cases involving ghosts
like Michael Ray Graham, Jr. not only haunt the criminal justice
system, but also shake the lofty pedestal upon which the reliability
of criminal procedure unsteadily rests. In 1986, the Louisiana police
found themselves under pressure to solve a case involving the
murder and robbery of an elderly couple. The police subsequently
uncovered ample evidence seemingly inculpating Graham for the
murder.' During the investigation, the ex-wife of Albert Ronnie
Burrell told police that she saw blood on her ex-husband's boots, one
of the victims' Social Security cards in his wallet, and $2700 in his
possession on the night of the crime.' Graham was linked to Burrell
when Kenneth St. Clair, with whom Graham had been staying in
Louisiana, told investigators that Graham had blood on him when
he returned from a late-night trip with Burrell on the evening of the
crime.4 Furthermore, a fourteen-year old girl staying at the same
home as Graham informed police that she saw Graham and Burrell
counting money in a suitcase on the night of the double murder.5
Since he was already in a Louisiana jail for forgery, police
investigators did not have to travel far to locate Graham.6 There
they unwittingly stumbled upon the prize piece of evidence that
cemented the case against him. Graham's celmate, Olan Wayne
Brantley, notified police that Graham had confessed to his role in
the murder of the elderly couple, while awaiting trial on the forgery
from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair
doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve .. " Id.
2 Christopher Baughman & Tom Guarisco, Justice for None: The State Sent Albert
Ronnie Burrell and Michael Graham to Death Row for 13 Years, Only Later There Wasn't
Enough Evidence to Convict Them. How Could This Happen?, BATONROUGEADVOCATE, Mar.
18, 2001, at 1-A. The victims, Delton and Callie Frost of Downsville, Louisiana, were
murdered by someone who fired a rifle through a window in their home, killing the couple
where they sat. Id. Mr. Frost, distrusting banks, kept cash in a suitcase that police were
unable to find after searching the crime scene. Id. As a result, police believed robbery to be
the motive for the crime. Id.
' Id. The two met twice on the night of the crime to discuss issues related to their son.
Burrell's ex-wife told police that the evidence of the crime appeared during their second
meeting and was not present during their first encounter on that night. Id.
' Id. Graham met the St. Clair family in his home state of Virginia and traveled to
Louisiana for a visit while staying with the family. Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. Graham and Kenneth St. Clair, the man who told police about Graham and
Burrell's unexplained late-night journey, were both in jail for forgery and cashing $300 worth
of stolen checks. Id.
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charges.7 In 1987, a jury convicted Graham of the murder and
robbery and sentenced him to death.'
As Graham languished on death row in the Louisiana State
Penitentiary at Angola,9 the prosecution's tight knit case against
him unraveled. In 1988, Albert Burrell's ex-wife, who testified at
the trials of both Graham and Burrell, changed her testimony,
claiming she had fabricated the entire story in an effort to regain
custody of her son from her ex-husband."0 Similarly, the fourteen-
year old girl, who testified only against Graham, recanted her
testimony in 1998." She claimed that the family with whom she
had been staying at the time of the murders pressured her to give
false testimony to deflect suspicion away from a family member.12
In addition to the reversal of these two key witnesses, Graham's
attorneys unearthed new facts on appeal to paint Brantley, the
jaihouse informant, in a light unknown to the jury during the trial.
Brantley, also known as "Lyin' Wayne," had been found not guilty
of a crime by reason of insanity in 1981. In another case, a judge
found Brantley mentally incompetent to stand trial. 8 Furthermore,
the jurors in Graham's trial did not know that, before "Lyin' Wayne"
took the stand, he had cut a deal with prosecutors to reduce his own
7 Id.
B Lawrence Hammack, 2nd Man Gains Release from Louisiana's Death Row, ROANOKE
TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan. 21, 2001, at A9. Both Graham and Burrell received death
sentences. Baughman & Guarisco, supra note 2.
9 Christopher Baughman & Tom Guarisco, Justice for None, THE BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE, Mar. 20,2001, at 1-A.
10 Id. Burrell's attorney asked Burrellrs ex-wife, "None of this testimony was true." with
her responding "Right." Id. The attorney then asked "And" the reason you gave it was
because [your grandmother and another woman] told you to make that up to help you get
custody of the minor child, is that correct?" To which ex-wife replied, 'Thats right." Id.
Based upon the ex-wife's change of testimony, the state Supreme Court sent the case back to
the trial court to determine if the new evidence warranted a new trial for Burrell. Id. See
also Baughman & Guarisco, supra note 2 (noting state social workers had given custody of
the couple's son to Albert Burrell).
" Baughman &Guarisco, supra note 9. The girl claimed in her recantation thatKenneth
St. Clair was the one with blood on him. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. Brantley turned out to be a career criminal with a 35-page criminal record. For
example, one of Brantley's schemes involved posing as an heir to the Opryland estate fortune.
See also Baughman & Guarisco, supra note 2 (documenting comment of retired local jailer
familiar with Brantley, "[i]f his lips moved, he was lying.). Defense attorneys questioned
Brantley about his mental health during the trial, but he claimed the medicine he had been
taking for 10 months merely helped to control hyperactivity. Id.
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sentence in exchange for his testimony in Graham's trial. 4 Gra-
ham's attorneys also learned that Brantley manufactured confes-
sions in two other murder cases while in Florida jails during 1994
and 1996.16 In sum, the retractions by the ex-wife and the fourteen-
year old impugning the credibility of"Lyin' Wayne" eviscerated the
evidence used at trial to convict Graham.
Armed with the new information, Graham's defense attorneys
sought a new trial for their client.'6 A Louisiana District Judge
granted Graham's request for a new trial in March 2000 based upon
the failure of the prosecution to disclose facts that might have
helped Graham's defense. In her ruling, the judge not only faulted
the prosecution for its failure to tell the jury about the plea agree-
ment for Brantley's testimony, but also charged that it had glossed
over Brantley's history of concocting jailhouse confessions and
"misled" jurors as to his true mental state. 8 Moreover, the judge
noted that the prosecution failed to inform defense attorneys that
they possessed information linking the murder weapon to Burrell,
rather than Graham, which could have helped Graham's murder
defense.' 9 The judge reasoned that withholding this type of evidence
intruded upon the jury's right "to make its decision based on
complete, correct facts and the correct law.' 2' Based on the
misconduct of the prosecutors and the reversals of the witnesses of
Graham's trial, the judge concluded that she had "no confidence in
14 Baughman & Guarisco, supra note 9.
15 Id. One of Brantley's stories involved someone who allegedly confessed to stabbing an
attorney 56 times, decapitating the attorney, and then driving over the body twice. Another
fabrication involved an individual who allegedly confessed to stabbing an elderly man for his
ATM card and then burying him in a shallow grave. Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
" Id. The allegations of misleading the jury arose from exchanges between the
prosecution and Brantley in front of the jury. Although the prosecution revealed that
Brantley had spent time in mental hospitals to the jury, the prosecution also told the jury
that the medicine Brantley was taking at the time of the trial merely controlled hyperactivity.
Moreover, the prosecution asked, "[b]ut you were never found to be mentally incompetent or
legally insane, were you?" Brantley responded, "I don't guess." The judge wrote that if the
prosecution did not know aboutBrantley's history of mental illness, that"[i]twould have been
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the outcome of this trial" and accordingly ordered a new trial for
Graham.2'
After the judge issued her order for a new trial in March 2000,
the Attorney General's Office, which had taken over Graham's
prosecution, began a new investigation into the 1986 murder of the
elderly Louisiana couple.22 Given the retracted testimony of the
witnesses and the absence of physical evidence linking Graham to
the crime, the Attorney General's Office decided to dismiss the case
against Graham in December 2000, stating that "a total lack of
credible evidence" existed to connect Graham to the murders.2 3
After spending 13 years and 129 days in prison, Michael Ray
Graham, Jr. walked off of death row and into a very different world
from the one which he had previously known. As Graham walked
into strange world filled with cell phones and the Internet, he
carried all of his worldly possessions in two manila envelopes.24 For
Graham's time and trouble in prison, the State of Louisiana gave
him what every inmate receives upon being released from prison,
whether guilty of the crime charged or not-ten dollars and a denim
jacket.
25
21 Id. The judge put little faith in the recantation of Burrell's ex-wife, because she
recanted her testimony a total of three times during Graham's ordeal. After the first
retraction of her testimony at trial (where she told defense attorneys that she lied on the
stand in 1987 to get custody of her son) she changed her story again in 1988 saying she had
testified truthfully at both Graham and Burrell's trials. She claimed a friend forced her to
go to the defense attorney's office and take back her testimony in 1987 and used a gun as a
means of compulsion. Later in 1995, the ex-wife again changed her story and saying she had
indeed lied on the stand at the trials of both men. The judge did, on the other hand, give
weight to the retraction of the fourteen.year old girl because the judge found no ulterior
motive for her recantation and called her new testimony "reliable and trustworthy." Id.
22 Id.
' Protectingthelnnocent" Ensuring Competent Counsel inDeathPenalty Cases: Hearing
Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Michael Graham).
24 Sara Rimer, Two Death-Row Inmates Exonerated in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2001, at A8 (noting Louisiana also released Burrell for same reasons shortly"after releasing
Graham).
' Id. The $10 check from Louisiana was not enough for Graham to get a bus ticket home
to Virginia. As a result, one of his lawyers purchased the $127 Greyhound bus ticket that
allowed Graham to get home. Id. Although the $10 check is supposed to be for transportation
home, it is all but useless unless the released inmate lives in the nearby area. Nevertheless,
a prison spokeswoman stated "We can't afford to send them out of state. We're not
responsible for getting them home. They could ask to go to Africa or Australia." Id.
Furthermore, Graham did not even keep the check. The bus carrying Graham stopped in
Atlanta the day following his release on its way to Virginia. As he got off the bus, Graham
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Graham's experience is one of a long and growing list of wrongful
convictions that disprove the idealistic notion that "[i]nnocent men
are never convicted .... It is a physical impossibility."26  To the
contrary, abundant evidence demonstrates that wrongful convictions
have maligned our criminal justice system in the past and continue
to do so today. Edwin Borchard's 1932 work, Convicting the
Innocent, chronicles the cases of sixty-five individuals whom the
author argued were "completely innocent" of the crime for which
they were convicted. 27 More recently, a 1992 study documented 416
unjust convictions in capital and potential capital cases from 1900
to 1991, including twenty-three cases of wrongful execution.25
spotted a homeless man sitting in the cold weather. Graham found a place to cash the check
and gave his $10 to the homeless man. Id. See also Statement of Michael Graham, supra
note 23 (noting denim jacket was five sizes too large).
26 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE vii
(1932) (attributing quote to Massachusetts prosecutor). See also, e.g., Marty I. Rosenbaum,
Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide Convictions, 1965-1988,18 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 807, 807 (1990/1991) (noting New York State Defenders Association
Wrongful Conviction Study Project found "a significant number of wrongful convictions");
Charles Anzalone, J.L. Ivey Spent More Than Five Years in Jail for a Murder He Didn't
Commit. Can Any Amount of Money Repay What He Lost?, BUFFALO NEWS, June 27, 1993,
Buffalo Magazine (describing conviction and subsequent exoneration of J.L. Ivey); Barton
Gellman, DNA Test Clears Man Convicted of SE Rape: Move Keeps Findings Out of D.C.
Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1990, atA12 (reporting dropping of rape charges against Edward
Green after DNA testing); Denis Hamil, For an Innocent Man Time Means Money, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 20, 1989, at 18 (reporting on unjust conviction and compensation of Bobby McLaughlin);
J. Michael Kennedy, DNA Test Clears Man Convicted of Rape, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at
BI (documenting facts surrounding arrest and exoneration of Mark Bravo); Larry King,
Salvaged by Science: DNA Helps Set the Innocent Free, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May
14, 1995, at A22 (reporting releases of Garrett Davis and David Shepherd after DNA evidence
exonerated them); Daniel J. Lehman, DNA Results Free Man on Bond in 1990 Rape Case,
CHI. SuN-TIES, Dec. 6, 1995, at 8 (documenting DNA exoneration of Richard Johnson);
James F. McCarty, DNA Test Lets Prisoner Go Home, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 17, 1994, at Al
(recounting release of Brian Piszczek after DNA tests proved innocence); James Thorner,
DNA Test Frees Innocent Man, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 1, 1995, at Al (documenting
arrest and exoneration because of DNA testing of Ronald Cotton following rape conviction).
27 BORCHARD, supra note 26, at viii.
28 MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN
CAPITAL CASES 270-73 (1992). See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (detailing
study upon which book is based). But see Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting
the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 126-44 (1988)
(disputing findings of Bedau-Radelet study contending study fails to show individuals were
innocent); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to
Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988) (presenting authors' response to their
critics).
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Lamenting the ability of the criminal justice system to prevent
unjust convictions, the authors of the 1992 study asserted that
"most errors caught in time are corrected not thanks to the system
but in spite of the system."29
Even more recently, the National Institute of Justice published
a report in 1996 (the "NIJ report") describing twenty-eight wrongful
convictions for sexual assault and murder for which the unjustly
convicted individuals served an average of seven years in prison.30
Beyond these twenty-eight wrongful convictions, a portion of the
NIJ report observed that "[e]very year since 1989, in about 25
percent of the sexual assault cases referred to the FBI ... where
results could be obtained... the primary suspect has been excluded
by forensic DNA testing."3 ' Given that DNA tests excluded one in
four of the FBI's primary suspects, "[e]ven if one assumes half the
normal conviction rate.., one would expect that hundreds of people
who have been exonerated by FBI DNA testing. . . would have
otherwise been convicted." 2 In short, the study found that "the
extent of factually incorrect convictions in our system must be much
greater than anyone wants to believe."3"
29 RADELET ET AL., supra note 28, at 279.
3 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THEUSE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE iii (1996) [hereinafter NIJ REPORT].
"' Id. at xxviii (commentary by Peter Neufeld, Esq. & Barry C. Scheck). See also id. at
20 (describing lab results that form basis for 25% exclusion rate). In short, 19 labs offered
data regarding the total number of cases they handled with the accompanying number of
exclusions or inconclusive results. The labs reported that they received 21,621 cases for DNA
analysis, and the primary suspect was excluded based on the results in 23% of those cases.
The FBI reported that it received 10,600 cases with a 20% exclusion rate. Id. However, if
cases where the FBI results proved inconclusive are omitted, the exclusion rate rises to 25%.
Id.
"2 Id. at xxix (noting "state conviction rates for felony sexual assaults average about 62
percent").
33 PETER J. NEUFELD & BARRY C. SCHECK, DNA. UNDERSTANDING, CHALLENGING AND
CONTROLLING THE NEW EVIDENCE OF THE 90'S xxix (1990). See also C. RONALD HUFF ETAL.,
CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 10-11, 55-62 (1996)
(containing study of Ohio's criminal justice system as method to calculate error rates in
convictions). The study defined innocent as not committing a crime or not committing the
crime for which one was convicted and excluded those acquitted after a second trial or appeal
because of violations of a defendant's rights. This led the authors to an error rate of .5%,
which when applied to the 1.9 million convictions for FBI index crimes, suggests approxi-
mately 10,000 unjust convictions occur in the United States per year. Id.
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Following wrongful incarceration and fortuitous exoneration "in
spite of the system," many newly freed individuals faithfully return
to the justice system seeking redress for the harms resulting from
their wrongful convictions. 4 Traditional tort law causes of action,
such as cases based on the theory of malicious prosecution, provide
a legal basis for the suits of those trying to obtain compensation for
their wrongful convictions.35 In addition to tort law remedies, the
statutory codes of sixteen jurisdictions contain explicit provisions
providing for compensation of individuals wrongfully convicted and
incarcerated.3" As a general matter, these statutory provisions not
only contain eligibility requirements, but also specify the amount of
damages recoverable. To be eligible to receive compensation under
the federal statute, for example, a claimant must demonstrate that:
1. His conviction has been reversed or set aside on
the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of
which he was convicted, or on new trial or
rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense,
as appears from the record or certificate of the
court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or
that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground
of innocence and unjust conviction 37
3 See, e.g., Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler, 2 ExoInmates Get $7Million for 17 Lost Years,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al (recounting compensation of two inmates unjustly convicted
of murder); Andrew Smith, Freed Man Sues State/Seeks $40 Million for Eight Years in
Prison, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1998, at A32 (discussing Clarence Braunskilrs attempt to obtain
compensation for being wrongfully convicted of selling cocaine); Paul W. Valentine & Richard
Tapscott, Md. to Give Cleared Man $300,000, WASH. POST, June 23, 1994, at B1 (reporting on
rape conviction, exoneration, and compensation of Kirk Bloodsworth).
s See infra notes 162-70; 180-87 and accompanying text.
s 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-06 (West 2000 & Supp.
2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421 (2001); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1999); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8241-44 (West Supp. 1999);
MD. CODEANN. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (1957);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West 2001); N.Y. Or. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 148-82 to -84 (West 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.02, 2743.48 (West
1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (1999); TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001-
007 (Vernon 1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (Michie 2000); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05
(West 2001).
37 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) (1994).
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and
2. He did not commit any of the acts charged or his
acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such
charge constituted no offense against the United
States, or any State, Territory or the District of
Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect
cause or bring about his own prosecution.38
If a claimant clears these hurdles, then he may receive up to $5000
for his unjust conviction and imprisonment under the federal
statute. The five-thousand dollar cap applies whether the claimant
spent 1 year or 20 years behind bars. s
Regardless of the avenue by which compensation is sought,
statistics indicate that only 37% of wrongfully convicted persons
actually receive compensation.4" To play on the words of Learned
Hand, the failure to compensate wrongly convicted persons should
be the "unreal dream," but instead it is the nightmarish reality in
cases where "archaic formalism" and "watery sentiment" did not
protect innocent citizens from wrongful convictions.4
The purpose of this Article is to examine the various methods of
compensating wrongly convicted individuals and propose an
alternative to existing methods. Part II describes various mistakes
and abuses that may occur during criminal investigations and trials
that allow people to be convicted of crimes they did not commit.
Part III presents an overview of the legal and legislative approaches
unjustly convicted persons use to seek redress for their wrongful
conviction. While this Article argues that statutory compensation
is the most equitable avenue of redress for the wrongly convicted, it
also asserts that current statutory schemes grossly
undercompensate the wrongly convicted. As a result, Part IV
proposes a revised statutory remedy based upon a capped formula
that examines both the economic and noneconomic injuries suffered
Id. § 2513(a)(2).
Id. § 2513(e).
0 BARRY ScHEcK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 230 (2000).
41 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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by the wrongly convicted individual. In light of modern political
realities, this revised statutory proposal achieves a better balance
between the interests of state legislators and the wrongly convicted
than do the current compensatory statutory remedies.
II. CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
According to the Supreme Court, "the central purpose of any
system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the
innocent."42 Nonetheless, cases of wrongful conviction expose the
failure of our system and its process to attain this "central purpose"
without levying a substantial penalty on a significant number of
innocent people. Errors that occur during the administration of
criminal justice, from the initial police investigation up to and
including the criminal trial, threaten the integrity of the entire
criminal justice system and the validity of its resulting convictions.
Whether in good faith or not, mistakes involving eyewitness
misidentification, police or prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective
representation and dubious scientific evidence are frequently cited
as the leading causes of wrongful convictions.43 Most cases of
wrongful conviction contain a number of errors that function in
concert to bring about an unjust result." In sum, the criminal
justice system's search for truth runs the ever-present risk of
convicting the innocent.
42 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993).
4' NIJ REPORT, supra note 30, at xxx. See also BORCHARD, supra note 26, at xiii-xxiv
(including other factors such as perjury and damaging effect of existing criminal record);
Michael Higgins, Tough Luck for the Innocent Man, 85 A.B.A. J. 46 (Mar. 1999) (describing
how honest mistakes can be responsible for wrongful convictions as in case of David
Shephard). A New Jersey jury convicted Shephard based on the honest yet mistaken
identification of him by the rape victim. After spending eleven years of his life in prison, a
DNA test proved his innocence and Shephard obtained his freedom. Id. In Shephard's case,
the witness made an honest mistake, understandable given the heinous nature of the crime
she suffered, and the police and prosecutors relied upon her mistaken identification.
Moreover, it was within the realm of jury discretion to convict Shephard based upon the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Nevertheless, the jury convicted an innocent man.
Id.
" NIJ REPORT, supra note 30, at xxx (noting mistakes function "singly and often in
combination."). See also HUFF ETAL., supra note 33, at 145 (stating "in most cases of wrongful
conviction the system breaks down in more than one way").
674 [Vol. 36:665
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A. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
In comparison to other types of evidence prosecutors use to
convict alleged criminals, eyewitness testimony is among the most
persuasive. As one commentator has noted, "there is almost nothing
more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand,
points a finger at the defendant, and says, 'That's the one!' ""
However, studies consistently find that "the single most important
factor leading to wrongful conviction in the United States and
England is eyewitness misidentification... [made] in good faith."'46
According to Justice Brennan, "Itihe vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification."47 Moreover, experience
suggests that "convictions based solely on testimony that identifies
a defendant previously unknown to the witness is highly suspect.
Of all the various kinds of evidence it is the least reliable, especially
where unsupported by corroborating evidence."4 Thus, eyewitness
misidentification is a well-documented evidentiary phenomenon
arising in part from police pressure to provide key evidence in
solving a crime and also from the mistaken witness' internal
pressure to see justice done.4"
The ordeal of Kevin Green is one of many examples of how
mistaken eyewitness identification has lead to unjust conviction and
incarceration in the aftermath of a horrible crime. In September
1979, Green left his home to get some hamburgers at a nearby fast
food restaurant late one night after a fight with his wife.50 Green,
5 ELIzABETH F. LoFTus, EYEWTNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979).
46 HUFFETAL., supra note 33, at 66. See also NIJREPORT, supra note 20, at 24 (stating
"[i]n a majority of the cases, given the absence of DNA evidence at the trial, eyewitness
testimony was the most compelling evidence. Clearly, however, those eyewitness identi-
fications were wrong.") See also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 263 (graphing types of
errors in proportion to one another).
47 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978).
9 See NIJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 24 (quoting Dr. Loftus from an October 15, 1995
article). Dr. Loftus stated there is "pressure that comes from the police [who] want to see the
crime solved, but there is also psychological pressure that is understandable on the part of
the victim who want to see the bad guy caught and wants to feel that justice is done." Id.
5o SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 240; Daniel Yi, Wrongly Convicted Man Settles
Lawsuit Brought by Ex-Wife, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Dec. 8, 1999, at B1.
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a 22-year old Marine corporal, returned home to find his pregnant
wife, Dianna, unconscious and lying in a pool of blood following an
attack that left the young woman in a coma for a month.5' The
beating robbed Dianna of her memory, her senses of hearing and
smell, and required doctors to perform an emergency cesarean
section to save her life at the expense of her unborn child.52 When
Dianna regained her memory, she informed her mother that it was
Green who attacked her on the night of the crime.53 This revelation
changed the direction of the police investigation. The police
arrested Green for the crime, shattering the lives of both Green and
his wife.54 At trial, Dianna testified that her husband hit her with
a key caddy and then proceeded to rape her.55 Based largely upon
the strength of her testimony, a jury convicted Green of the rape of
his wife and the second-degree murder of his unborn child. 6 Green
was sentenced to fifteen years to life and shipped to prison.57
Despite his conviction, Green maintained his innocence throughout
the first sixteen years of his sentence.
In 1996, a detective investigating an unsolved crime from 1980
stumbled upon evidence that buttressed Green's claim of
innocence.5" The detective's investigation turned up a man already
in prison on a parole violation named Gerald Parker, who confessed
to the crime for which Green had been convicted.59 Seeking to
5' SCHECKETAL., supra note 40, at 239-40.
52 Higgins, supra note 43, at 49; Yi, supra note 50.
3 SCHECK ETAL., supra note 40, at 240. Prior to Dianna's revelation, police thought the
crime had been committed by a prowler in the area known for crimes of the type endured by
Dianna, a suspicion that would later be proven correct. Id.
"' Higgins, supra note 43, at 49. See also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 240-41
(describing suspicion of police following Dianna's recovery). While police began to more
closely scrutinize Green's alibi involving the late night restaurant trip, they also overlooked
exculpatory evidence. For example, Dianna claimed to have been hit by a bottle or can of
beer, but police found no beer at the house after conducting a search. Id.
' See SCHECKET AL., supra note 40, at 241. The key caddy was not mentioned in any of
the police reports nor dusted for fingerprints. Id.
Id.; Yi, supra note 50.
5 Higgins, supra note 43, at 46. Green served his time at San Quentin State Prison in
California until transferred for his safety. Id.
5 SCHECKETAL., supra note 40, at 241-43. Green had been denied parole several times
because he steadfastly maintained his innocence instead of accepting responsibility for crime.
Id.
59 Id. at 241-42 (noting Parker said "you better go get that Marine off death row for
killing his wife. I did that one.").
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validate his confession, Parker suggested that police test the DNA
evidence used in Green's case, and using new DNA technology,
police found that the DNA evidence matched Gerald Parker and not
Kevin Green." In light of the new scientific evidence, a judge
declared Kevin Green innocent of the rape and attempted murder
of his wife after almost seventeen years in prison based upon a
mistaken eyewitness identification.6
B. POLICE, PROSECUTOR, AND SCIENTIFIC (MIS)CONDUCT
Errors committed by police and prosecutors also contribute to the
failure of the criminal justice system to protect the innocent from
wrongful conviction.62 When a heinous crime occurs, the public puts
pressure on police officials to solve the crime and prosecutors to
convict because of its desire for justice and need to feel safe. In
response to public pressure to solve a crime, "the police may be
tempted to cut corners, to jump to conclusions, and.., to manufac-
ture evidence to clinch the case."6" Once police officers arrest a
' Id. at 243. To Green's good fortune, one of the detectives had decided to keep the old
rape kit. Id.
61 Higgins, supra note 43, at 46. See also Nancy Hill-Holtzman, Bill Tries to Right 16.
Year Wrong, L. TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Apr. 25, 1999, at B1 (reporting on "unprece-
dented bill" to compensate Kevin Green for wrongful imprisonment); Daniel Yi, Serial
Murderer Receives Death Penalty for 70's Rapes, Killings, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Ed.),
Jan. 22, 1999, at BI (noting Parker earned nickname "Bedroom Basher" for spree of killings
in late 1970's in which he knocked victims unconscious, then raped or attempted to rape
them). During the sentencing, the judge described Parker's conduct as "inhuman behavior
beyond belief' and rejected Parker's argument that the death penalty should not be imposed
due to his drug habit and troubled childhood. Id. Notably, Dianna still maintains that her
ex-husband was responsible for her baby's death. Shortly after his conviction, Dianna filed
a wrongful death lawsuit against Green saying in court papers that she had been "beaten and
raped by two men". Id. See also Yi, supra note 50 (reporting Dianna won multi-million dollar
judgment against Green by default because of his imprisonment). Dianna asserts Green beat
her and left her unconscious prior to Parker's entrance into the home and her subsequent
rape; therefore, Green is partially responsible for the death of the unborn daughter. Id.
62 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 175 (stating "[flor 63 percent of the DNA
exonerations analyzed by the Innocence Project study, misconduct by police or prosecutors
played an important role in the convictions"). See also NIJ REPORT, supra note 30, at 15
(reporting 8 of 28 cases in study involved governmental misconduct); Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21,
57 tbl. 6 (1987).
' Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 135 (Autumn 1998).
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suspect and present the prosecutor with inculpating evidence, the
prosecutor faces public pressure to convict the suspect that is
heightened by the political nature of her office.64 A prosecutor with
political ambition beyond her current office must appear to be tough
on crime or her chances for political advancement diminish.65 As a
result, prosecutors may be tempted to bring cases based on scant
evidence to both quell the public's clamor for justice and improve
their own political future.
The case of Rolando Cruz vividly demonstrates how police and
prosecutorial sins of omission and commission place innocent
individuals at risk for lengthy stays in prison. In February 1983,
ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico was abducted from her home, raped,
and murdered in Naperville, Illinois.66 Given the horrific nature of
the crime and public outrage over the slow progress of the investiga-
tion, police developed a task force comprised of local law officials
and offered a sizable award for information leading to the arrest of
the perpetrator.67 Police thought they had gotten a break when
Rolando Cruz contacted them to provide information about a crime
after the alleged perpetrator attempted to take Cruz's life.6" While
riding with a single sheriffs officer, Cruz relayed a "vision" he had
involving a girl who had been dragged from her home, dumped in a
field, hit so hard in the back of her head that it left an impression
in the mud, then sodomized and left for dead.6 After hearing this
story and recognizing its resemblance to the facts of the Nicarico
case, the lone officer suggested that Cruz tell another officer about
his "vision," and Cruz complied.7" Although the two officers
allegedly called a sheriffs sergeant in the same department to
" See Interview with Bennett Gershman, Frontline: The Case for Innocence, available
at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/gershman.html (lastvisited Jan.
8, 2002) (stating "[Prosecutors] are political officials").
61 Id. See also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 181 (recounting 1988 presidential
campaign where George Bush damaged Michael Dukakis with television ad describing Willie
Horton's rape of woman while on release from prison).
' Maurice Possley, The Nicarico Nightmare: Admitted Lie Sinks Cruz Case, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 5, 1995, at Al.
' Id. In fact, the award had been set at $5000 but was increased to $10,000 because of
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inform him about Cruz's tale, the two officers never documented the
story on paper believing the story would be obtained under oath
during a grand jury hearing."1 As a result, no written record existed
of Cruz's "vision," and, notably, prosecutors did not ask him about
it during the grand jury proceeding.7" Nevertheless, the grand jury
indicted Cruz for the heinous crimes committed against Jeanine
Nicarico," and he proceeded to trial in 1983 on a course that would
twice repeat itself.4
Prosecutors planned to introduce testimony regarding Cruz's
"vision!' but did not inform the defense until the eve of trial.75
Nevertheless, over defense objections, the two officers convincingly
testified about Cruz's dream at trial.76 Without any physical
evidence to link Cruz to the murder, a jury convicted Cruz and a co-
defendant and sentenced them to death in 1984. 7 The Illinois
Supreme Court overturned Cruz's conviction in January 1988,
reasoning that Cruz was denied a fair trial by reason of the
introduction of admissions of codefendants. 7 While Cruz's convic-
tion was pending on appeal another man, Brian Dugan, came
forward to police and confessed to the Nicarico murder.79 Despite
Dugan's confession, prosecutors ignored his story and concentrated
on Cruz's retrial."0 Upon retrial, Cruz was again convicted of the
7' Id. See Eric Zorn, Vision of Murder Blind to Truth in Rolando Cruz Case, CHi. TRm.,
Nov. 1, 1995, § 2, at 1 (noting police created no record of story during 4 follow-up interviews).
Moreover, the Tribune article suggests Cruz created his story out of thin air in an attempt
to get the $10,000 reward. Id. However, the details of the dream and the facts of the case do
not match up as well as police alleged at the time of the crime. Id. See also Maurice Possley
&JeffreyBils, Braggart'CruzRaised Some Doubts Ex-Prosecutor Says Not All Was Believed,
CI. TRm., Nov. 2, 1995, § 2, at 1 (reporting former prosecutor advised sheriffs officers
against write-up in favor of waiting for grand jury proceeding).
72 Possley, supra note 66.
73 Id.
"' Ted Gregory, Prosecutors Offer Details of Alleged Cruz Conspiracy, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 3,
1997, § 2, at 1.
" Maurice Possley, NightmareFollowsDream for Cruz Prosecutors: Inconsistencies Rise
from Transcripts, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1996, § 2, at 1.
76 Id.
7 Possley, supra note 66. Alejandro Hernandez and Stephen Buckley were tried along
with Cruz. Hernandez was also convicted and sentenced to death while the jury could not
agree on a verdict for Buckley. Id.
78 People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18, 22-24 (111. 1988).
71 Possley, supra note 66.
' William Rentschler, For Mishandling of Cruz Case, Ryan Must Resign, CI. SUN-
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Nicarico murder with the help of the two sheriffs officers testimony
regarding Cruz's vision, and he was again sentenced to death."' On
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court again overturned Cruz's
conviction in 1994-this time based upon Dugan's statements to
police suggesting that he alone committed the murder.82 Moreover,
DNA testing performed after the second Illinois Supreme Court
argument linked Dugan, not Cruz, to evidence left at the scene of
the crime.8"
Following the second reversal of Cruz's conviction, determined
prosecutors began preparations to try Cruz for the Nicarico murder
for a third time. However, before they got the opportunity to re-try
Cruz their case against him rapidly disintegrated. Discovering his
conscience, the sergeant who had allegedly been called by the two
sheriffs officers searched his own records and discovered that he
could not have spoken to them because he was in Florida at the time
of the alleged phone call.84 The sergeant impeached his prior
testimony regarding the truthfulness of the officers' story during a
hearing to suppress the "vision" evidence before Cruz's third trial,
testifying that the phone call about Cruz's dream could not have
occurred. 5 In the aftermath of the sergeant's revelation, a cloud of
suspicion and doubt engulfed the testimony of the two officers
regarding the "vision," particularly because they had conveniently
failed to document any evidence of it in written form.86 Given the
absence of physical evidence linking Cruz to the crime, DNA test
results excluding Cruz as the donor of crime scene evidence, and the
likelihood that the sheriffs officers had manufactured testimony,
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at 17 (asserting prosecutors ignored evidence against Dugan because
of "obsession" with Cruz); see also Eric Zorn, Cruz Prosecutors Trip Themselves Trying to
Shuffle, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 29, 1995, § 4, at 1. The prosecutors minimized similarities
between Dugan's story and facts of case to bolster their case against Cruz. For example,
Dugan said that he murdered the little girl on a certain path upon which a prior prosecutor
had said substantial amounts of blood had been found. To minimize the similarity with
Dugan's story, the substantial amount of blood now became "thumb-sized". Id.
sI Possley, supra note 66.
s People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636 (11. 1994).
8 See NIJREPORT, supra note 30, at 46 (noting DNA tests excluded Cruz and Hernandez
as donors of semen found at scene of crime but prosecutors argued evidence only showed they
were not the rapists, not that they were absent from crime scene).
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the presiding judge found the defendant not guilty and dismissed
the case against Rolando Cruz in November 1995.87 Cruz left death
row after spending approximately twelve years there for a crime he
did not commit.88
Further investigation into Cruz's unjust conviction revealed that
in addition to manufacturing evidence, prosecutors strategically
withheld evidence to secure a conviction in this high-profile case.
For example, the trial judge ordered the prosecution to turn over
any evidence it planned to use in its case to the defense, which
clearly should have included revealing the "vision" evidence to the
defense team.89 The prosecutors, however, did not reveal their
knowledge of Cruz's dream to the defense until four days before the
beginning of jury selection, a full 290 days after the court order.90
Furthermore, the prosecution withheld other information tending
to exonerate Cruz until 1989, five years after the judge's order.91
While interviewing Brian Dugan, the man who confessed to the
murder in 1985, police officers recorded notes in which he described
fifty facts about the murder to demonstrate his culpability.1
2
Instead of investigating Dugan's assertions, prosecutors brushed
Dugan's claim aside by claiming that a police investigator coached
Dugan as to the facts described in his confession. 3 However, the
investigator could not have fed Dugan any information about the
case because prosecutors obtained Dugan's story a full three days
prior to his interview with police.94 In their zeal to convict Cruz,
both police and prosecutors consistently acted to "conceal evidence
favorable to Cruz and to cook up evidence that would convict him." 5
87 Id.
' Id.; see also Eric Zorn, Freedom Smells SweetAfter Life on Death Row, CHI.TRB., Nov.
5, 1995, at 1 (calculating time of Cruz's incarceration at 12 years, 3 months, and 3 days).






' Ken Armstrong, Indictments Tear at Prosecutorial Teflon, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1996,
at 1; see also Possley, supra note 75 (reporting prosecutor issued 79 page indictment against
three prosecutors and four sheriffs officers for their part in Cruz's wrongful conviction
including charges ofperjury, obstruction ofjustice, and official misconduct); Maurice Possley
& Ted Gregory, DuPage 5 Win AcquittaL Jurors Join Courtroom Celebrations After Verdict,
Cmu. TRIB., June 5, 1999, at 1. A jury acquitted all of the individuals of their alleged crimes
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In addition to fabricating or withholding evidence, police may
also use coercion to obtain false confessions to be used at trial.
Indeed, "false confessions have played a major role in the conviction
of innocent people." 6 Like eyewitness identification, a confession
can be a very persuasive piece of evidence and is "probably the most
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted" because it
comes from the mouth of the accused.s7 Although police are
forbidden to use physical torture to procure a confession, 8 the
persuasive value of confessions creates an incentive for police to use
a variety of manipulative techniques. Police officers might, for
example, pretend to have a case solved but offer to give the suspect
an opportunity to tell her side of the story, lie to a suspect about the
evidence against her, or pretend to be sympathetic to a suspect in an
effort to get her to utter an incriminating statement.99 Any
inconsistency unearthed during interrogation, regardless of the
tactics involved, is a dangerous weapon in the hands of a prosecutor
and threatens to place innocent individuals in prison.
Although many people cannot conceive of innocent people
admitting to crimes they did not commit, the cases demonstrate that
the innocent will frequently submit to police coercion if placed under
enough pressure.1 In one example, Gary Gauger called police and
in the Cruz case. In a bizarre twist, the cleared police officers and prosecutors hugged and
shook hands with the jurors following the verdict. See also SCHECKETAL., supra note 40, at
180 (providing explanation for acquittal). The defense lawyers reminded the grand jury that
Cruz had filed a civil rights lawsuit against the state as a result of his wrongful conviction.
By so doing, defense attorneys gave grand jurors the impression that convicting the officials
(now numbering five because two had been previously acquitted) would cost taxpayers a large
sum of money to fund Cruz's award of damages. Id.
9 See HUFF ETAL., supra note 33, at 65; see also SCHECKET AL., supra note 40, at 78-106
(documenting cases involving false confessions in wrongful convictions and pointing to
Innocence Project study finding 23% of wrongful convictions resulted from false confessions).
" Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); see also
SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 92 (noting "73 percent of jurors will vote to convict even
when admissions have been repudiated by the defendant and contradicted by the physical
evidence").
'8 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936) (prohibiting physical torture after
three African-American men were tied to tree and whipped until interrogators obtained
confession).
'9 YALE KAMISAR, POLICEINTERROGATIONAND CONFESSIONS 1-80 (1980) (discussing other
tactics, such as playing on suspeces fears or attempting to wear suspect down via repetitive
questioning).
" See SCHECKET AL., supra note 40, at 92 (stating "[m]ost jurors can't swallow the idea
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asked them to come to his home after discovering a crime that
"rankled the psyche" of a small community: the murder of his two
elderly parents.'' Once on the scene, police became suspicious of
Gauger because of his unemotional response to the brutal slaying.0 2
As a result, police took Gauger into custody and brought him to the
local sheriffs office for questioning.' During the course of the
interrogation, investigators continually peppered him with emotion-
ally charged questions.0 4 In addition, investigators threw pictures
of his parents' dead bodies in front of him and told him that they
had discovered the murder weapon.0 5 For good measure, Gauger's
interrogators told him that he failed a polygraph test regarding his
role in the crime and that they possessed a "stack of evidence
against him."' 6
Despite Gauger's denial of any involvement in the crime and his
claim that he had no memory of committing the murders, police
knew about Gauger's continuing struggle with alcohol and suggested
that he might have committed the murders during an alcoholic
"blackout.""0 7 Police then asked Gauger a hypothetical question
about how he would kill his parents if he had chosen to do so.'0 8
Tired from the interrogation, Gauger answered by telling investiga-
tors that he would sneak up behind each of his parents and slash
their throats, a story that appeared to resemble the facts of the
case.'0 9 Equating Gauger's hypothetical killing to a confession,
that people would admit to crimes they had not committed").
101 Andrew Martin & Robert Becker, Was Prodigal Son a Killer?: Sister Fights for Twin
Held in Parents'Deaths, Ci. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1995, § 2, at 1. Gauger found the bodies of his
parents, whose throats had been slashed, while taking some customers through his parents'
motorcycle shop after not seeing them for almost two days. Id.
102 Id. Upon finding his father, Gauger knelt beside him and said "[o]h Jeez, dad." Id. at
14. He then went to call police and returned to the customers. In addition, Gauger allegedly
smoked marijuana while police searched the crime scene for evidence. Id.
103 Id.
' Charles Mount, 'Confession' Was Forced, Gauger Says, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1993, § 2,
at 1.
1D5 Id.
"0 Charles Mount, Murder Confession Story Derided; Cops Say Gauger Was Asked No
Hypothetical Questions, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1993, § 2, at 7.
107 Mount, supra note 104.
1o8 Id.
109 Id. Gauger claimed to have said
I told them I had a knife on me all day because I had been working and
that I would have gone to my mother's [oriental rug sales] office. She
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police decided that Gauger had murdered his parents and turned
the case over to local prosecutors. 10
Based upon the strength of Gauger's statements, a jury took only
three hours to convict Gauger of the murder of his parents and
sentenced him to death in 1993.1" However, Gauger's supporters
discovered facts to cast doubt on the validity of his statements and
pointed to several aspects of the questioning that suggested undue
coercion on the part of police investigators. In total, the interroga-
tion lasted approximately twenty-two hours, during which time,
Gauger had fifteen cups of coffee, one sandwich, and no sleep." 2
Gauger also had no attorney present during any of the
questioning."' Although interrogators stressed that they possessed
a large amount of incriminating evidence against Gauger, police
actually had no physical evidence whatsoever linking him to the
crime." 4  Investigators also misrepresented the outcome of the
polygraph test. The results did not show that Gauger had failed as
investigators told him, but instead proved to be inconclusive." 5
Furthermore, investigators failed to record any of the questioning
on tape or in written form, which constituted a departure from
standard procedure and created uncertainty about the reliability of
investigator accounts of the inquisition."'
trusts me. I would have grabbed her by the hair from behind and cut her
throat.
Then I would have kept her from falling.... Then ... I would have
gone into my father's [motorcycle] shop and killed him the same way.
Id.
110 Id.
"' Martin & Becker, supra note 101; see also Charles Mount, Doubt Told in Murder
Conviction: Confession Coerced, Gauger Lawyer Says, CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1996, § 2 at 2
(noting Gauger's death sentence was reduced to life in prison based upon mitigating
circumstances such as his lack of criminal record).
112 Charles Mount, Jury Told of Murder Confession, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1993, § 2, at 5
(reporting duration of interrogation); see also Mount, supra note 104 (reporting on lack of food
and sleep).
"' Ray Quintilla & Charles Mount, Court Throws Out Son's Murder Conviction, CHIC.
TRIB., Mar. 12, 1996, § 2, at 1.
11. RobertBecker&AndrewMartin, Vicious Killer or GentleFarmer?: 2Portraits Emerge
of Gary Gauger, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1995, § 2 at 1 (reporting search of Gauger land lasted
twelve days); see also Charles Mount, supra note 111 (notingpolice confiscated 163 items over
two-week period, but failed to link any to Gauger or the crime).
..5 See Becker & Martin, supra note 114.
116 Id.
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Given the circumstances surrounding Gauger's alleged confes-
sion, an Illinois appellate court overturned Gauger's conviction in
1996.117 The court reasoned that police improperly obtained
Gauger's statements during their interrogation and decided that the
trial court should not have allowed the statements to be introduced
before the jury."' According to the court, " 'It]he defendant's
inculpatory statements were the fruits of an illegal arrest,'... 'we
find that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to
suppress [the] statements.' "119 With that, the State of Illinois
released Gauger after he spent three and a half years of his life in
prison, including eight months on death row." 0
Along with coerced false confessions, the scientific evidence
embraced by prosecutors is often subject to questions of reliability.
Scientific analysis of hair, blood, semen, or DNA can be powerful
evidence from which "prosecutors are often able to conclusively
establish the guilt of a defendant."' 2' The seeming immunity from
error and conclusive nature of scientific evidence in conjunction with
testimony from scientific experts sporting innumerable, esoteric
academic and professional credentials entices jurors into giving
scientific results dispositive weight. However, scientific testing is
not immune from error, as revealed by cases of wrongful convictions
resulting from fraudulent scientific results.
117 See Quintilla & Mount, supra note 113.
118 Id.
119 Id.
Dave Daley, GanglnformantAdmits to Lying in Court Befor" ButHeDefendsAccount
of Slayings of Gaugers, CHic. TRIB., Apr. 27, 2000, § 2 at 1. A member of a motorcycle gang
confessed to killing the elderly couple along with another member of the same gang. Carolyn
Starks, '93 Slaying of Couple is Detailed, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1999, § 2, at 1. According to the
gang member, the two killed the couple for money and had previously staked out the Gauger
home because they knew the couple had money in it. Id. Upon committing the crime,
however, the killers only obtained a total of $15. Id. Nevertheless, they laughed about the
crime and said they could "write a book about how to do the perfect murder and not get
caught because the son had admitted to it." Id. The gang member came forward with his
statements about the Gauger murder after making a plea deal for a reduced sentence in
exchange for testimony against 16 other gang members who had been indicted for a variety
of crimes. Id. See also Dave Daley, Biker Given 45 Years in 1993 Slaying in Richmond: Ex-
Outlaw Sentenced in Slaying on Farm, CHIC. TRMB., Mar. 10, 2001, § 2, at 5 (reporting biker
who confessed to killing Mrs. Gauger received forty-five year sentence).
121 NIJREPORT, supra note 30, at iii.
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. Contrary to the seeming independence of scientific results, one
survey found that "[s]eventy-nine percent of all laboratories... are
located within law enforcement/public safety agencies."'22 In fact,
the majority of crime labs only perform scientific testing on evidence
submitted to them by the prosecution.123 In other words, these labs
earn their money from tests performed at the behest of prosecutors.
As a result,
[t]he "independence" of forensic science is often
largely mythical. A series of case records suggests
that scientific testimony is frequently distorted or
molded to fit preconceived misassumptions about the
nature of the crime or the guilt or innocence of the
accused.'24
One of the most glaring examples of scientific fraud in criminal
justice history emerged after a five-month long investigation of Fred
Zain, a former serologist with the West Virginia State Police Crime
Laboratory. 2 ' The investigation revealed Zain had a "long history
of falsifying evidence in criminal prosecutions" by providing
evidence against defendants that, for example, "overstat[ed] the
strength of results" or "report[ed] scientifically impossible or
improbable results."'26 Moreover, the investigation found that the
"2 Joseph L. Patterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's
Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985).
123 Id. at 13.
124 Paul Wilson, Lessons from the Antipodes: Successes and Failures of Forensic Science,
67 FORENSIC SCI. IN'L 79, 82 (1994).
" In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 502 (W. Va. 1993).
121 Id. at 503. The full list of Zain's acts of misconduct included:
(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of
genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the
frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting
that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item had been
tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly
altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous
impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples
tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to
report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (10)
implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a match
with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable
686 [Vol. 36:665
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irregularities in Zain's scientific work resulted from "systematic
practice rather than an occasional inadvertent error."2 ' Zain's
investigators cast doubt on the validity of up to 134 cases in which
his "pattern and practice of misconduct" produced pro-prosecution
evidence from 1986 to 1989.128 Even more troubling, "Zain's
supervisors may have ignored or concealed complaints of his
misconduct" thereby contributing to "an environment within which
Zain's misconduct escaped detection." '129 In fact, Zain's patent
misconduct, and the laboratory environment that allowed it, pierced
"the heart of the State's case in every prosecution in which Zain was
involved."' 30 As a result, the investigation concluded that "as a
matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by
Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed




'2 Id. at 503-04, 510-11. The investigation only reviewed records from 1986-1989
although Zain's tenure of employment lasted from 1979-1989. Id. at 510 n.4. The case that
shed light on Zain's conduct involved the conviction of Glen Dale Woodall for multiple felonies
resulting in a prison sentence of 203-305 years. Id. at 509 (citing State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d
253 (W. Va. 1989)). Zain testified this analysis indicated that Woodall's blood types were
"identical" to the assailant, and that the blood traits would "statistically occur in only 6 of
every 10,000 males in West Virginia." Id. Later DNA testing proved Woodall innocent of the
crime and he recovered one million dollars from West Virginia as a result of his wrongful
conviction. Id.
12 Id. at 504. The report had previously noted that Zain appeared to be "quite skillfulin
using his experience and position of authority to deflect criticism of his work by subordinates."
Id. at 503. In addition, the report found a variety of procedural deficiencies that operated in
conjunction with Zain's superiors to mask his misconduct. The procedural difficulties
enumerated in the report included.
(1) no written documentation of testing methodology; (2) no written
quality assurance program; (3) no written internal or external auditing
procedures; (4) no routine proficiency testing of laboratory technicians; (5)
no technical review of work product; (6) no written documentation of
instrument maintenance and calibration; (7) no written testing procedures
manual; (8) failure to follow generally-accepted scientific testing standards
with respect to certain tests; (9) inadequate record-keeping; and (10)
failure to conduct collateral testing.
Id. at 504.
130 Id. at 519.
"31 Id. at 506; see also Laura Frank & John Hanchette, Convicted on False Evidence?:
False Science Often Sways Juries, USATODAY, July 19,1994, at 1A (reporting on Zain's move
to Texas following his misconduct in West Virginia); Mark Hansen, Lab Evidence Questioned,
A.B.A.J., July 1994, at 16 (reporting Zain's work in Texas came under fire for similar reasons
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C. INEFFECTIVE DEFENSE COUNSEL
Although police and prosecutors serve as the most ready targets
for allegations of wrongdoing leading to an unjust conviction,
defense attorneys may be equally responsible for wrongful convic-
tions in some cases. A recent study found that "27 percent of the
wrongfully convicted had subpar or outright incompetent legal
help."" 2 Predictably, a lack of monetary resources lies at the root of
the problem of inadequate representation for wrongfully convicted
defendants. Because many defendants are indigent, 3 3 statutes
commonly endow judges with the power to appoint attorneys at the
expense of the state.'34 However, court-appointed defense attorneys
are often overworked and grossly underpaid,15 a combination that
jeopardizes the adequacy of representation in any case. In fact, the
American Bar Association called for a moratorium on capital
punishment in 1997 because of "overwhelming evidence that some
defense lawyers lack the basic tools for defending a death penalty
case-they are underfunded, untrained and, frankly, all too often
incompetent."'
13 6
Despite the Court's commendable mandate in Gideon v.
Wainrightl37 that provides indigent defendants with lawyers to
ensure a fair trial, 3 8 courts frequently review records "where the
incompetence of counsel is patent and the attendant consequences
as in West Virginia and that Zain was indicted for his misconduct in Texas).
13 See SCHECKETAL., supra note 40, at 92 (reporting on study by Innocence Project); see
also BORCHARD, supra note 26, at xx (citing inadequate defense counsel as one factor in
wrongful convictions).
'33 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS 27 (8th ed. 1994).
'" See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (Michie 2000); VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-163 (1999).
13 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 191 (calling caseload of public defender
"overwhelming"); Lis Wiehl, A Program for Death-Row Appeals is Facing Elimination, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at B16 (discussing 1995 cut in federal monies for attorneys serving
death row inmates). See also generally Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 377-97 (1995)
(discussing inadequate funding of poor defendants);
" Phillip S. Anderson, Letter, Executions Must Be Put on Hold, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23,1999,
§ 1 at 14.
'37 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Id. at 343-45.
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to the particular case and the justice system are disastrous."" 9 In
Illinois, for example, an attorney attempted to represent a defen-
dant charged with murder, kidnapping, and rape while under
investigation related to his handling of another client's estate. 4 '
During a disciplinary hearing to investigate his administration of
the estate, the attorney admitted that "he was so stressed out he
couldn't think straight" because of the intersection of the criminal
trial and his professional collapse.' In light of his attorney's
inability to "think straight" during the trial the criminal defendant,
Dennis Williams, received a new trial and eventually won his
freedom, after serving eighteen years in prison, based upon
exonerating DNA evidence.'42 Similarly, a court-appointed attorney
for Federico Martinez-Macias in a capital murder case failed to
present an alibi witness to challenge his client's culpability, failed
to interview witnesses to rebut prosecutorial evidence at trial, and
declined to investigate evidence pertaining to good character to
reduce his client's criminal sentence.' 3 Commenting on the
compensation provided by Texas for Martinez-Macias' counsel,
$11.84 per hour, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that
"the justice system got only what it paid for '."'144 Thus, the conduct
of police, prosecutors, and pro-prosecution scientists is only one side
of the wrongful conviction equation; a significant part of the danger
comes from those charged with defending the innocent.
13 In re Amendment to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 688 So.2d 320, 321 (Fla. 1997)
(Anstead, J., specially concurring).
140 People v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 136, 142-43 (IMI. 1982). Williams' attorney also
represented two of Williams's co-defendants for the same crime, each of whom had
simultaneous trials. Id. at 137.
", Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense By Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5,2000, at Al.
14 Id.; see also Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 138 (recounting that defendanes attorney, later
disbarred, had $23,000 judgment against him for his handling of unrelated matter); In re
Weston, 242 N.E.2d 236, 236.37 (1982) (discussing allegations against Williams attorney).
" Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 810 F. Supp. 782, 786-87 (W.D. Tex. 1991); see also Susan
R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 24
LAW &SOC. INQUIRY 533 (1999) (observing "erroneous convictions after trials and false pleas
of guilty frequently result from defendants' inability to adequately investigate the facts").
'" Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (granting writ of
habeas corpus because defendant was "denied his constitutional right to adequate counsel").
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III. REMEDIES FOR THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
After enduring wrongful incarceration, newly freed, unjustly
convicted individuals traverse a number of legal avenues in their
attempts to obtain compensation for their time behind bars. The
wrongly convicted typically place the blame at the feet of those
involved in the flawed process that placed them in prison using
either legal or legislative remedies. The blame-fixing aspect of
compensatory claims is reflected in both the variety of claims
brought by the wrongly convicted and those against whom such
claims are made, including police officers, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys. 45 Wrongly convicted individuals who have suffered an
infringement on their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
may bring claims against police or prosecutors under the umbrella
of section 1983. More commonly, however, wrongly convicted
individuals initiate traditional tort law claims against prosecutors
and defense attorneys, seeking to establish that either prosecutorial
misconduct or ineffective representation by defense counsel led to
their incarcerations. In addition to claims based on the Constitution
or the common law, some wrongly convicted individuals rely on
legislation, either in the form of special compensatory legislation or
statutory remedies already on the books, to furnish compensation
for the injustice resulting from their prison time. Regardless of the
legal theory used to pursue compensation, the underlying claim to
compensation is that "liberty is absolute and the loss of it is the
greatest of all human injustices."
146
A. LEGAL REMEDIES
Section 1983 provides a statutory foundation for wrongly
convicted individuals to seek redress from police officers and
'" Mistaken witnesses are generally immune from lawsuits resulting from their mistakes
unless the mistake is made out of malice and the prosecution of the individual was
groundless. Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (10th Cir. 1992); White v. Frank, 855
F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1988).
" Mary Ann Giordano, Rulings on Wrongful Imprisonment Due; How Much is Freedom
Worth to the Innocent?, MANHATTAN LAw., June 13, 1989, at 1 (quoting judge in New York
wrongful conviction case).
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municipalities who are, in the eyes of the wrongly convicted, the
initiators of the series of events that led to their plight. 4 7 In short,
section 1983 allows individuals to bring a lawsuit for damages
against any official acting under color of state law, who deprives
that individual of a constitutional right.148 One common section
1983 claim brought by the wrongfully convicted against police
alleges that the evidence or incriminating statements used in their
prosecutions were obtained in violation of the constitutional
protection against illegal searches and seizures. 4 9 Police officers
acting in their official capacities are "acting under color of state law"
for purposes of a section 1983 claim. 5 ° According to the Supreme
Court in United States v. Classic,'5' the "[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law, is action taken
'under color of state law.' "152 Thus, actions of police officers that
result in the wrongful conviction of innocent individuals based upon
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments appear to place compensatory claims squarely within
the ambit of section 1983.
While section 1983 claims look amenable to providing compensa-
tion for the wrongly convicted, the complainant must overcome the
hurdle of showing that a constitutional violation occurred. To prove
such a violation by a police officer, for example, the wrongfully
accused may show the police lacked probable cause to conduct a
search or make an arrest in violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment. Unfortunately, the probable cause standard is so low
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983, entitled "Civil action for deprivation of rights," states
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
" St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-31 (1988).
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
15 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-08 (1945). Acts complained of in that case,
held to be acts under color of state law, included effecting arrest. Id. at 107.
. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
- Id. at 326.
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that proving its absence is nearly impossible. 5 ' Moreover, if the
police did have probable cause, they will be protected from liability
under section 1983 in all but the most egregious cases." 4 Beginning
with a request for a warrant, police officers possess qualified
immunity from liability in that " [o]nly where the warrant applica-
tion is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence unreasonable... will the shield of immunity
be lost."' 5
The U.S. Supreme Court declared in Pierson v. Ray'56 that "a
peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable
for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later
proved" as long as the officer acted in good faith and with probable
cause."' Any negligence on the part of police officers during a
criminal investigation is brushed aside because police officers are
only obliged "to conduct criminal investigations in a manner that
does not violate the constitutionally protected rights of the person
under investigation."'5 8 Moreover, the presence of probable cause
releases police officers from any duty to conduct further investiga-
tion that might uncover evidence of a suspect's innocence."' As
extensive as the protection is prior to trial, the shield of immunity
from liability for section 1983 violations even attaches to police
officers who offer perjured testimony at a criminal trial that leads
to an unjust outcome. 6 ' Despite its promise, making a section 1983
' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining probable cause as determination
based upon "totality of circumstances" where there is "fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place").
15 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,227 (1991). Police officers may still be found liable for
knowing violations of the law. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989),
overruled on other grounds by Osborne v. Rose, 133 F.3d 916 (4th Cir. 1998).
'" Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1986).
'5 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
1I7 Id. at 555 (reiterating qualified nature of immunity for police).
' Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
'9 Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Romero v. Fay,
45 F.3d 1472, 1476-78 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding presence of probable cause waived any
requirement that police investigate any alibi suspect may have at time of arrest).
160 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 341-46 (1983). The Court reasoned that police officers
have two ways to obtain immunity. One lies in the immunity given any lay witness, while
the other lies in the immunity of officials, such as judges or prosecutors, who play an
important role in the criminal process. Id. at 335. To hold otherwise would be to undermine
the contribution of the police to the judicial process and thwart the performance of their other
public duties. Id. at 343.
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claim against police officers based upon a wrongful conviction is a
daunting task with little chance of success given the low threshold
of probable cause and that police officers need only to act in "good
faith" to escape liability.
As an alternative to bringing suit against police officers, the
wrongly convicted often hold prosecutors responsible for their unjust
sentences and bring suit against them to obtain compensation for
the resulting injuries. In an attempt to make prosecutors liable for
a wrongful conviction, an unjustly convicted individual has the
option of asserting either a civil rights claim under section 1983 or
a traditional common law tort claim of malicious prosecution. An
exonerated person filing a section 1983 action charges that the
prosecutor, "acting under color of state law," unlawfully prosecuted
a criminal case against her that resulted in the loss of the funda-
mental right to liberty as protected by the Constitution and applied
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 161
Using the common law, on the other hand, a wrongly convicted
person initiating a malicious prosecution claim against a prosecutor
must show that (1) the prosecutor initiated a proceeding against the
individual; (2) the proceeding terminated in favor of the wrongly
convicted person; (3) the prosecutor initiated the case without
probable cause; (4) the primary purpose of the prosecution involved
malice or something other than bringing the individual to justice;
and (5) damage resulting from the prosecution. 162 To apply these
elements to prosecutors in cases of wrongful conviction, an exoner-
ated claimant essentially alleges that a prosecutor maliciously
brought criminal charges against her without probable cause and
obtained a conviction that resulted in her wrongful incarceration as
shown by her later exoneration.
Regardless of whether the claimant files a state claim based upon
the common law or a federal section 1983 claim, the doctrine of
absolute immunity stands as a significant barrier to recovery for the
'~ Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976);
' Dickey v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 286 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1960);
Pratt v. Kilborn Motors, Inc., 363 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Ill. App. 1977); Schmidt v. Richman
Gordman, Inc., 215 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Neb. 1974); Rose v. Whitbeck, 562 P.2d 188, 190 (Or.
1977).
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claimant. In Imbler v. Pachtman,'63 the Supreme Court examined
the issue of prosecutorial liability under section 1983 by referring
first to the rule governing prosecutorial liability under the common
law.'64 In short, the Court found that a "well settled" common law
rule endowed prosecutors with absolute immunity from suits arising
out of their prosecutorial duties.'65 According to the Court, the
"concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a
deflection of the prosecutor's energies... and the possibility that he.
would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of
judgment required by his public trust" justifies the prosecutor's
absolute immunity at common law. 166 Moreover, the mere risk of
prosecutorial liability hampers the functioning of the criminal
justice system itself in that prosecutors might decline to use some
evidence for fear of subsequent lawsuits, which prevents the trier of
fact from assessing all admissible evidence when making a determi-
nation regarding guilt or innocence."16 The Court held that the same
justification for absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law
applied with equal force in the context of section 1983 causes of
action.'68 Although the Court recognized that prosecutorial
immunity from section 1983 damages left a claimant without a civil
remedy against a prosecutor "whose malicious or dishonest action
deprive[d] him of liberty," the Court believed its rule served the
greater public interest when weighed against the harm threatened
by imposing liability on prosecutors.'69 To hold otherwise would
"' 424 U.S. 404 (1976).
Id. at 421-24.
l Id. at 424 (citations omitted).
'6 Id. at 423. "The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were
constrained in making every decision by the consequences.., of his own potential liability
in a suit for damages." Id. at 424-25. See also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926)
C'The public interest requires that persons occupying such important positions and so closely
identified with the judicial departments of the government should speak and act freely and
fearlessly in the discharge of their important official functions.").
'7 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426. Furthermore, post-trial procedures and their outcomes could
be colored by the knowledge that the decision could serve as the basis for a lawsuit against
the prosecutor. Id. at 427.
'68 Id. at 431 ("[I]n initiating- a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the
prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.").
' Id. at 427. The court noted the absence of liability under § 1983 did not prevent the
possibility of criminal penalties for willful deprivation of constitutional rights or professional
discipline from a prosecutor's peers. Id. at 429.
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"prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's
duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system."'
70
Shifting their focus away from the prosecutors, but using similar
legal bases, exonerated individuals expand the scope of potentially
responsible parties by filing claims grounded in either section 1983
or traditional tort law to scrutinize the performance of their own
defense attorneys during the trials that resulted in their wrongful
incarcerations. For purposes of a section 1983 claim, a wrongly
convicted individual alleges that the deficient performance of a
public defender, if one was used, prevented him from having
effective assistance of counsel and ultimately a fair trial as required
by the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 17' Alterna-
tively, a wrongly convicted individual has the option to pursue a
common-law legal malpractice suit against a defense attorney whose
negligent work ostensibly resulted in his unjust incarceration. To
bring a successful malpractice lawsuit, a claimant must show the
existence of an attorney-client relationship, the attorney's duty to
act according to the facts of a case, breach of the duty owed by the
attorney, and damage as a result of the attorney's breach.'12 To
satisfy the elements of a legal malpractice claim, wrongly convicted
individuals allege that some error or miscalculation committed by
their defense attorneys, such as the failure to present evidence at
trial deemed crucial by the claimant, resulted in the unjust verdict
that cost them their freedom. By asserting a section 1983 or a legal
malpractice claim, then, the exonerated individual possesses the
17' Id. at 427-28.
1.. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (finding defendant's
counsel's conduct before and during sentencing proceeding was not unreasonable under
appropriate standards).
1 For various permutations of these elements, see, for example, Krahn v. Kinney, 538
N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio 1989) ("[Tie note the requirements to establish a cause of action for
legal malpractice relating to civil matters. These are (1) an attorney-client relationship giving
rise to a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breath.");
Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.L., 813 S.W.2d 400,403 (Tenn. 1991) (stating
elements as duty owed by attorney to client, breach, damages, and proximate cause); Pierce
v. Colwell, 563 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (listing elements as presence of attorney-
client relationship, acts constituting negligence, negligence as proximate cause of alleged
injury, and actual damage); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAWOF TORTS, § 30 at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) (outlining traditional elements of cause of action).
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ability to turn the tables on allegedly negligent public defenders or
private defense attorneys by making them the defendants in trials
to assess their performances.
Much like the doctrine of immunity associated with the lawsuits
against prosecutors, significant obstacles block the road to recovery
against defense attorneys. For example, in Polk County v. Dodson'73
a claimant sought compensation from a public defender under
section 1983 alleging that the attorney's negligence deprived him of
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.174
Prior to analyzing any argument involving the effectiveness of the
representation, the Court looked to the functional nature of the
public defender in the criminal justice system to determine whether
a public defender acts under "color of state law" for purposes of
recovery under section 1983.175 The Court reasoned that, rather
than serving the state, the public defender opposes the state both in
the best interests of her client and in the interest of a justice system
that relies on an adversarial setting to promote truth and
fairness.176 According to the Court, the state had a constitutional
obligation to refrain from attempting to influence the independent
judgment of the public defenders that it employs to represent
criminal defendants.'77 In the view of the Court, the obligations and
duties of the public defender were the same as those of a private
attorney and were "in no way dependent on state authority."'78 As
a result, the Court held that "a public defender does not act under
color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions
as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding."'79  This
equivalence of a public defender to a private attorney, who clearly
does not act under color of state law, bars wrongfully convicted
13 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
174 Id. at 314. The attorney had been assigned to represent the claimant before the Iowa
Supreme Court, but sought to withdraw from the case because she deemed the claimant's
assertions to be frivolous. Id.
175 Id. at 317-19.
176 Id. at 318.
'77 Id. at 321-22 (stating "[t]here can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the
services of an effective and independent advocate").
178 Id. at 318.
179 Id. at 325 (stating holding did not necessarily preclude recovery for certain
administrative or investigative functions under specific circumstances not before Court).
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persons from recovering against public defenders under section
1983.
Wrongfully accused persons who seek to bring malpractice
actions against public defenders and private defense attorneys face
a similarly inhospitable environment. While defense attorneys do
not possess immunity from civil malpractice suits in state courts as
a general matter, 80 courts in two states, New Mexico and Minne-
sota, grant absolute immunity to public defense attorneys.' Courts
in four other states grant qualified immunity to public defense
lawyers barring suits for "malpractice arising out of discretionary
decisions that [were] made pursuant to their duties as public
defenders."8 2 In addition to these legislative grants of immunity,
state procedural rules provide yet another obstacle to recovery from
defense attorneys. For example, the running of the statute of
limitations period threatens to bar any lawsuit against a defense
attorney whose poor performance contributed to the ordeal of the
wrongly convicted.8 3
Even in the absence of immunity for defense attorneys, satisfying
the elements of a legal malpractice claim is a difficult task, because
states routinely apply the same minimal standard of care used to
examine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to claims
involving civil legal malpractice. 8 4 The Supreme Court delineated
the minimal standard used to analyze claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington.'85 In Strickland, the
court concluded that the appropriate test for evaluating such claims
' Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979).
'8' Harold H. Chen, Note, MalpracticeImmunity: AnIllegitimateandlneffectiveResponse
to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DuKE L.J. 783, 799-802 (1996).
l8 Id. at 796 (quoting Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 343, 344-45 (Nev. 1989)). States
providing qualifiedimmunityinclude Delaware, Nevada, NewYork, andVermont. Id. at 795-
96.
18 Compare Halliwell v. Brown, No. CV-366172 2000, WL 1867398, at *6-*8 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 14, 2000) (dismissing claim of malpractice because limitations period had expired,
reasoning limitations period began to run when individual discovered or should have
discovered injury related to attorney's performance, which could be measured from when
individual first consulted attorney about matter or first filed grievance), with Britt v. Legal
Aid Soc'y, 741 N.E.2d 109, 113 (N.Y. 2000) (finding limitations period does not begin to run
until day criminal action is terminated without conviction against claimant).
1 E.g., Rowe v. Shreiber, 725 So. 2d 1245, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Barner v.
Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 712 (Cal. 2000).
18 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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involved examining whether the attorney "made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed.. . by
the Sixth Amendment" and whether the "errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable."'86 As described in Strickland, the elements of a legal
malpractice claim are very difficult to satisfy because the standard
of care required of defense attorneys is extremely low. In most
cases, "[i]f a mirror fogs up when placed beneath the lawyer's
nostrils, he or she is not ineffective, as a matter of law."'87 Thus, the
odds of winning a legal malpractice lawsuit against a defense
attorney do not favor the wrongly convicted claimant.
B. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
Given the low odds of winning compensation in the courts against
police, prosecutors, or defense attorneys, well-connected wrongly
convicted individuals possess the option of turning to their state
legislatures to obtain compensation for their injuries. To obtain
redress in this manner, a wrongly convicted person must lobby his
state legislature to pass a private bill that dispenses money from the
state treasury directly to the lobbying individual as a remedy for the
injustice of being wrongly convicted.'88 For example, an exonerated
Edward Honaker persuaded the Virginia General Assembly to pay
him $500,000 as redress for the ten years that he spent in prison for
a rape he did not commit.'89 Similarly, the Ohio Legislature paid
William Jackson $720,000 as compensation for spending five years
behind bars for a series of frightening Columbus-area rapes he did
not commit. 9 ' Thus, a few wrongly convicted persons are able to
"8 Id. at 687. This encompasses the two elements of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel-deficient performance and prejudice to the defendant. The Court defines "prejudice"
as "a reasonable probability that, but for counsers unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
18 See SCHECKET AL., supra note 40, at 183 (calling standard "breath test:').
188 Bernard B. Bell, In Defense of Retroactive Laws, 78 TEX. L. REV. 235, 263 n.167 (Nov.
1999) (reviewing Daniel G. Troy, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION (1998)) (defining private bill as
piece of "special legislation," as opposed to general legislation, enacted by state legislature
concerning individual or small group of individuals).
1 Ruth Intress, Assembly Acts as VA's Court of Last Resort, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
Feb. 25, 1996, at A-1.
1"0 See Higgins, supra note 43, at 50 (noting police eventually discovered real rapist, "a
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successfully utilize state legislatures as courts of last resort in their
efforts to obtain compensation for their unjust convictions and
incarcerations.
Unfortunately, legislative compensation remains a longshot for
most wrongly convicted individuals for several reasons. First, the
courts of some states construe their state constitutions as forbidding
the passage of private compensatory bills.' 9' Seeking compensation
for approximately twelve years unjustly spent in prison for a 1994
rape he did not commit,' 92 David Shepard consulted an attorney who
initially thought that the state legislature could pass a private bill
that would set aside money for Shepard's benefit.'93 Unfortunately,
for Shepard the New Jersey Constitution declares that "[n]o general
law shall embrace any provision of a private, special or local
character,"94 and New Jersey courts construe this provision as
banning private bills. '95 The underlying reasons for such interpreta-
tions rests with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which provides that a legislature cannot pass bills for the
benefit of one person without passing legislation for all similarly
situated people.'96 As a result, Shepard found himself barred from
obtaining special compensatory legislation because such legislation
confers "some special right, privilege, or immunity or impose[s]
some particular burden upon some portion of the people of the State
less than all." 97
Beyond the problem of statutory construction, the availability of
legislative compensation through private bills is limited by the
realities of politics and influence. Indeed, special legislation from
a state legislature is likely only available to wronged individuals
with the support of those influential in the political world of the
man with a similar name and appearance").
' See, e.g., Kalisek v. Abramson, 599 N.W.2d 834, 837-39 (Neb. 1999); Rector v. State,
495 P.2d 826, 826-27 (Okla. 1972).
192 Robert E. Misseck, DNA Evidence Exonerates Man of Kidnap-Rape: 32-Year Old Free
After Serving 11 Years, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Apr. 29,1995, availableat 1995 WL 5220867
(reporting Shepard worked near area of crime, and victim said one of her two assailants
referred to other as "Dave").
193 See SCHECKETAL., supra note 40, at 231.
19 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 7.
195 See SCHECKETAL., supra note 40, at 231.
196 Id.
7 People v. Wilcox, 86 N.E. 672, 673 (Ill. 1908).
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state. Commenting upon the propriety of private bills, the New
York Law Review Commission stated:
The enactment of such legislation is simply an ad hoc
approach which is not in the best interests of the
State, not only because it can fail to compensate the
truly aggrieved, but also because it can lead to
charges of influence, political power, etc., that create
an appearance of impropriety and undermine the
integrity of the legislative process.'98
Needless to say, most unjustly convicted individuals neither possess
nor are fortunate enough to acquire supporters with sufficient
political savvy to obtain compensation in this manner.
Furthermore, even with sufficient political clout, the ebb and flow
of state politics may affect the ability of the wrongly convicted to
receive compensation from state legislatures. For example, a 1963
Florida jury convicted Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee of murder and
sentenced each of them to death.' After being exonerated in 1975,
the pair of men lobbied the legislature year after year in an attempt
to receive a remedy from the state for their injuries."0 Despite their
attempts, Democratic legislators who controlled the state legislature
at the time, repeatedly denied their requests for compensation,
claiming their constituents believed that the two were guilty of the
crimes and so would never support any award of legislative
compensation.2 0 ' However, the political tide turned when Republi-
cans gained control of the legislature in 1998. Republican leaders
in Florida backed the compensatory legislation as "a symbol of their
interest in building relations with black voters and African-Amer-
,98 NEWYORKLAW REVIEW COMM'N, REPORTT9THE GOVERNORON REDRESS FORINNOCENT
PERSONS UNJUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUEITLY IMPRISONED, 1984 N.Y. LAWS 2915.
"' Mike Williams, Florida Moves to Make Peace with Wrongly Convicted Men; Payments
of $500, OOOApproved by Lawmakers for Two Who Spent 12 Years on Death Row, ATLANTAJ.-
CONST., May 1, 1998, at CI.
2W Id.
"' Id.; see also Mark Hollis, Wrongly Convicted Pair Win Legislative Victory, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIB., May 1, 1998, at 1A (stating legislators doubted support from their constituen-
cies for compensation).
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ican legislators."20 2 With the political winds in their favor, the
Republican legislature granted each man $500,000 as compensation
for his wrongful conviction. 2" Thus, the adage that "timing is
everything" may apply with exceptional force to the lobbying efforts
of the wrongly convicted to obtain special legislative compensation.
Recognizing the shortcomings of litigation against attorneys and
private bills as a means of compensation for the wrongly convicted,
the statutory codes of sixteen jurisdictions contain provisions
allowing the wrongly convicted to bring suit directly against the
state.0 4 For example, the New York statute establishing a claim of
unjust conviction proclaims that:
The legislature finds and declares that innocent
persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes
and subsequently imprisoned have been frustrated in
seeking legal redress due to a variety of substantive
and technical obstacles in the law and that such
persons should have an available avenue of redress
over and above the existing tort remedies to seek
compensation for damages.205
To circumvent the problems with existing tort remedies, the
statutes utilize a two-tiered investigation to evaluate the compensa-
tory claim of a wrongfully convicted individual. The first tier
examines a claimant's eligibility for compensation as a result of her
wrongful conviction and generally requires proof of a claimant's
innocence of the crime for which she was convicted.206 In Maine, for
example, a claimant must obtain "a written finding by the Governor
o Williams, supra note 199.
Id.
2 See supra note 36 (listing jurisdictions where statutory remedy is available).
N.Y. Cr. CL. ACT § 8-b(1) (McKinney 1989).
As an initial matter, a claimant must also show that she was convicted of a crime and
spent time in prison as a result of that conviction. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 775.05(1)(2) (2001). In
addition, states differ as to what class of crime results in an injury compensable by the state.
Some provide compensation as a result of"a criminal offense." E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421
(2001). Other states provide compensation only for felonies. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900
(West 2000). Some states provide compensation for wrongful convictions for misdemeanors
or felonies. E.g., IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(a) (1988).
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who grants [a] pardon [stating] that the person is innocent of the
crime for which that person was convicted."2 7 In addition to the
stringent requirement of obtaining a gubernatorial pardon as proof
of innocence, some states allow a claimant to prove eligibility by
showing that a court dismissed, reversed, or vacated the conviction
or accusatory instrument on grounds consistent with actual
innocence. 08 On the other end of the spectrum, New Hampshire law
states that a claimant "found to be innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted" is eligible for compensation without specifying the
type of proof required to show innocence. °9 Furthermore, many of
the statutes require that a claimant demonstrate that he "did not,
by any act or omission on his part, either intentionally or negli-
gently, contribute to bringing about his arrest or conviction."21 In
sum, the statutes uniformly require that a claimant show that he is
innocent of the crime for which a jury convicted him before dipping
into the state treasury to provide compensation for her injuries.
After satisfying the burden of proof on the element of innocence
in the first tier of statutory analysis, which varies from a "clear and
convincing" standard in Wisconsin to a "preponderance" standard in
Texas,21' the second tier requires calculating the amount of compen-
sation a state owes the wrongly convicted person. Like the various
types of evidence used to demonstrate innocence and the burden of
proof standard that must be satisfied, the state statutes differ
sharply in the amount of compensation an unjustly convicted
individual may recover. Neither New York nor West Virginia set
limits on the amount grant a wrongly convicted person can recover.
'7 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 8241(2)(C) (West Supp. 1999). See also 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 505/8(c) (1999) (requiring pardon from governor to be eligible for compensation); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(b) (2001) (requiring governor's pardon); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 148-82 (1999) (same); TEX. Civ. PRAC. &REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.001(4) (Vernon 1997)
(same).
m E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422 (2001); N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8-b(3)(b) (McKinney 1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(4) (West 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (1999);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) (1994) (requiring same under federal statute).
209 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(I) (1997).
210 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (West 2000); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(c) (West
2001) (requiring conduct not bring about conviction); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(e)(3)
(Michie 2000) (same); WIS. STAT. § 775.05(4) (2001) (same); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2)
(1994) (requiring conduct or neglect not bring about conviction).
211 TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(4) (Vernon 1997); Wis. STAT. § 775.05(3)
(2001).
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In both states, he can receive a "sum of money as the court deter-
mines will fairly and reasonably compensate him." 212 However, a
majority of the statutes are less generous and place a cap on the
amount of money recoverable by the, wrongly convicted. For
example, Ohio limits a claimant's recovery to $25,000 per year of
incarceration along with any lost wages that directly resulted from
the imprisonment. 13 In contrast, Maine allows unjustly convicted
individuals to recover up to $300,000 for injuries resulting from
their incarcerations regardless of the amount of time spent in
prison. 214 On the conservative end of the spectrum in terms of
compensatory amount, California limits recovery to no more than
$10,000 for any and all injuries arising from a wrongful conviction
and incarceration of any length. 15 Similarly, New Hampshire and
Wisconsin limit recovery to $20,000 and $25,000 respectively.216
Joining these states, the Federal Government enacted a miserly
compensatory provision, allotting only a pittance of $5,000 for all
damages arising from an unjust conviction. 17
The vast disparities in the amount of statutory compensation
available to a wrongly convicted person reveal the most glaring flaw
in many of the statutory schemes: the statutory caps on compensa-
tion contained in all but two of the statutes. Capping compensation
at some arbitrarily low dollar amount all but mandates that a
wrongly convicted person be undercompensated for his injuries. For
example, the exonerated Kevin Green received the maximum ten-
thousand-dollar compensatory sum from the State of California
212 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(6) (McKinney 1989); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(g) (Michie
2000); see also D.C. CODEANN. § 1-1223 (2001) (stating "the judge may award damages").
213 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2) (West 1994) (including attorney fees and court
costs); see also IOWA CODE § 663A.1(6) (1998) (providing for court costs, attorney fees, $50 per
day of imprisonment as liquidated damages, and value of lost wages up to $25,000 per year).
214 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 8242(i) (West Supp. 1999) ; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 103.006 (Vernon 1997) (allowing for total of $50,000 in compensation).
215 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2001); see also § 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8(c) (1999)
(providing award of up to $35,000 that varies with amount of time in prison); MD. CODEANN.,
STATEFIN. &PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (2001) (limiting awards to actual damages); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4C-5 (West 2001) (awardingreasonable attorney's fees plus greater of twice amount of
income during year prior to incarceration or $20,000 per year of incarceration).
216 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(lI) (1997) (stating total compensation limited to
twenty thousand dollars); WIs. STAT. § 775.05(4) (2001) (providing award total of $25,000 not
to exceed $5,000 per year of incarceration plus attorney fees).
217 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (1994).
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under its fifty-eight-year old compensation statute after spending
more than sixteen years in its prison system for a rape and at-
tempted murder that he did not commit.218 Even more liberal
statutory schemes utilizing a cap, like that in Ohio which pays an
individual $25,000 per year for pain and suffering, threaten to
grossly undercompensate the wrongly convicted individual.21 The
$25,000 per year cap, which ostensibly limits recovery for pain and
suffering, discriminates against those who experience tremendous
noneconomic injuries. One who is only slightly injured will be
eligible for the same compensation as the individual who endures
extensive pain and suffering, such as an inmate on death row. As
a result, the statutory damage caps create an inherent risk that
significant injuries will fail to be compensated adequately.
IV. IMPROVING COMPENSATION FOR THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
Despite the risk of undercompensation, statutory compensation
provides the most equitable and readily available remedy in
comparison to those based upon special legislation or litigation. In
contrast to special private bills, a compensatory statute provides all
wrongly convicted individuals with an opportunity to obtain redress
for their injuries regardless of political connections or the happen-
stance of political interest. Furthermore, a compensatory statute
allows an unjustly convicted individual to seek redress for her
injuries without having to show malice, negligence, or some other
transgression by the state actors involved in the case. Because
malice or negligence cannot be shown in every case of wrongful
conviction, a statutory remedy recognizes that honest mistakes,
such as those involved in eyewitness misidentifications, occur and
penalize innocent people in our criminal justice system. In this
light, a compensatory statute preserves the justifiable immunity of
28 See Hill-Holtzman, supra note 61 (noting Green's case caught attention of state
legislator who proposed private bill to pay Green $770,000 for his injuries); see also Yi, supra
note 50 (reporting private bill passed California legislature and eventually gave $620,000 to
Green in October 1999).
219 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2) (West 1994). The statute lists compensatory
sums for attorney's fees, court costs, and salaries without specific reference to pain and
suffering. Id. However, the additional $25,000 sum may be deemed compensation for pain
and suffering since it is the one injury that is not expressly compensated. Id.
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police and prosecutors from lawsuits based upon the performance of
their jobs by providing an avenue of relief independent of their
conduct or decision-making. Compensation for the wrongly
convicted person under a statute is based upon the ability of the
claimant to show his innocence and not on a scouring of the record
in search of questionable police techniques or of faulty or malicious
prosecutorial inferences that led to conviction. As a result, statutory
compensation allows police and prosecutors to "speak and act freely
and fearlessly in the discharge of their important official
functions."220
Moving from the everyday world of police and prosecutors into
the legislative arena, a statutory damages cap reflects a political
balance between the diverging interests of state legislators and the
wrongly convicted. State legislators fear that allowing the wrong-
fully convicted to recover large sums of money, whether a product
of an uncapped lawsuit or one with a high cap, would be too
substantial a drain on their state treasuries.221 As political beings,
state legislators predictably hesitate to compensate fully the injuries
of the wrongly convicted at the expense of more politically attractive
projects. Weighed against the interest of state legislators and their
defense of state treasuries is the remedy required to redress the
manifest injustice experienced by the wrongly convicted individual
at the hands of the state's criminal justice system. If the appropri-
ate amount of the remedy is measured by the amount an individual
would demand to exchange places with a wrongfully convicted
person, then the compensatory sum would likely be remarkably
high. Thus, the statutory damage caps represent the clash between
scarce public funds and the remedy for the harm suffered by the
wrongly convicted where "any award is bound to be a mere token."222
The minimal statutory sums available to the unjustly convicted
stand in sharp contrast with the amounts potentially available to
victims of the similar common law tort of false imprisonment.223 A
m2 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926).
221 See Higgins, supra note 43, at 51 (noting such spending disrupts legislatures because
they cannot budget for it).
' Hoffner v. State, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955).
223 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (West 1999) (defining false imprisonment as "the
unlawful violation of the liberty of another").
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federal court in Maryland awarded $850,000 to a young man who
had been unjustly held for ten minutes in an Eddie Bauer store
while a store security officer falsely accused him of shoplifting.224 If
this young man had been wrongfully convicted of a federal crime
and imprisoned, he would have been entitled to a maximum award
of $5,000.225 In Texas, which provides a maximum of $50,000 for the
wrongly convicted regardless of the length of incarceration, 226 a jury
awarded a woman approximately $150,000 for mental pain,
humiliation, embarrassment and similar claims after being falsely
imprisoned in a jail cell for nine to eleven hours. 27 Similarly, a
California jury awarded $10,000 to a man falsely arrested by police
for car theft and forced to spend four hours in a jail cell.228 Ironi-
cally, the falsely imprisoned victim would have received the same
amount in California had he been falsely convicted and sent to death
row for ten years. In short, the statutory sums allotted to the
wrongly convicted generally pale in comparison to the awards given
to victims of false imprisonment. While victims of false imprison-
ment may suffer significant harm as a result of their traumatic
experiences, the wrongly convicted clearly endure at least equiva-
lent injuries. Compensation schemes must diminish this glaring
disparity.
Notably, the statutory caps on monetary recovery for erroneously
convicted persons mirror damage caps in other areas of the law that
22 David Stout, 3 Blacks Win $1 Million in Bauer Store Incident, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1997, at A16. The incident involved a total of three young men. A security guard became
suspicious of a young man whose shirt looked new in the eyes of the security guard. Id.
Indeed, the shirt was new because the young man had purchased the shirt the previous day
in the same store and a cashier remembered him. Nonetheless, the security guard
approached the young men and actually confiscated the shirt from the young man who had
aroused his suspicion. Id.
m 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (1994).
22 TEX. CIv. PROC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.006 (Vernon 1997).
17 Dayton Hudson v. Altus, 715 S.W.2d 670,672 (1986). The young woman was a shopper
at Target whom security officers suspected of stealing three pens with a value often dollars.
Police searched the woman upon her arrival at the jail and then put her into a cell with
people whom she believed were on drugs. The young woman claimed that the jail cell was
noisy, dirty, and contained a filthy toilet with no seat cover. Id. at 672-74. Although the
woman did not seek medical help after her ordeal, she did speak with her priest. Id. As
evidence of the emotional distress caused by the experience, the victim quit teaching Sunday
school and lost time from work. Id. Furthermore, children teased the victim's children about
the affair. Id..
"' Washington v. Farlice, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (Ct. App. 1991).
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emerged following the tort reform movement that began in the
1970s. 229 During this period, Congress added damages recovery
caps to an array of statutes, ranging from the well-known Civil
Rights Act of 1991230 to the obscure Longshore & Harbor W6rkers'
Compensation Act.23 ' Similar statutory caps were added to state
codes.232 In sum, statutory damage caps have become a pervasive
feature of tort litigation in this country.
One feature of the tort reform movement that spurred its
advance was the creation of statutory damages caps for noneconomic
injuries. When the Illinois General Assembly enacted its Civil
Justice Reform Amendments in 1995, it enacted a $500,000
statutory cap on the recovery of noneconomic damages in claims of
medical malpractice. 23 The statute defined "noneconomic" damages
as "damages which are intangible, including but not limited to
damages for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss of
consortium, and loss of society."2 4 To justify its imposition of the
noneconomic damages cap, the legislature claimed that such
damages were difficult to quantify, that the cost of the tort system
increased taxes and medical expenses in general, and rejected the
229 David Fink, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, The Remittitur Doctrine, and the
Implications for Tort Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (1999) (observing tort reform
movement in general began during 1970's with perceived explosion of tort litigation which
allegedly threatened availability of medical aid).
o 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2)-(3) (1994) (containing sliding cap on damages for intentional
employment discrimination under Title VII depending upon size of employer).
231 33 U.S.C. § 906(b)(1)-(2) (1994) (fixing compensation at percentage of national average
weekly wage).
I' See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2001) (limiting award of punitive damages to
$250,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994) (applying complex scheme to limit exemplary
damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (1996 & Supp. 2001) (capping exemplary damages
at greater of $250,000 or two times amount of compensatory damages). One of the most
common statutory caps contained in state codes is a limit on recovery for medical malpractice.
Michigan limits medical malpractice compensation to only $280,000, with exceptions for
grevious injuries increasing cap to $500,000. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483 (1996). See also,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (1997) (limiting liability of hospital or physician for medical
malpractice to $1,000,000 per patient); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1998) (capping medical
malpractice recovery at $1,250,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2000) (allowing
maximum recovery of $1,600,000).
2" Fink, supra note 229, at 249.
2m Id. at 250.
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philosophy of "tort theorists who would use tort doctrine as a system
of socialized compensation insurance."2"5
Prior to the passage of the Illinois act, only a judge possessed the
power to reduce an award of noneconomic damages. As a result, the
statute predictably came under state constitutional fire, arriving
before the Illinois Supreme Court in Best v. Taylor Machine Works,
Inc.2" 6 The court observed that the special legislation clause of the
Illinois Constitution prohibited the legislature from "conferring a
special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of
persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated."3 7 Construing
the noneconomic damages cap in light of the ban on special legisla-
tion, the court found that the cap "discriminate[d] between slightly
and severely injured plaintiffs, and also between tortfeasors who
cause severe and moderate or minor injuries.""2 As a result, the
court characterized the granting of compensation as nothing more
than arbitrary, noting that the cap not only failed to cement the
credibility of the tort system, but also thwarted the achievement of
consistency and rationality in the justice system.239 Furthermore,
the court deemed the cap to be a "legislative remittitur" that
"disregard[ed] the jury's careful deliberative process in determining
damages that will fairly compensate plaintiffs who have proven
their causes of action."24 By so doing, the cap "encroach[ed] upon
the fundamentally judicial prerogative of determining whether a
jury's assessment is excessive within the meaning of the law."24'
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court declared the noneconomic
damages cap to be unconstitutional under both the ban on special
legislation and separation of powers clauses of the Illinois Constitu-
tion.242
' Id. (citing 1995 Ill. Laws 89-7).
2 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
2r Id. at 1069.
fa Id. at 1075.
1 Id. at 1076 (noting legislative intent to achieve consistency and rationality in civil
justice system as one goal of cap).
240 Id. at 1079-80.
241 Id. at 1080 (referring to court's power of remittitur). Furthermore, the court found
that the cap forced a claimant to sacrifice that portion of a jury's award above the cap,
violating the rule in Illinois that a court lacked the power to reduce an award if the claimant
objects to the reduction. Id.
242 Id. at 1081.
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Applying the reasoning in Best to the damage caps on compensa-
tion for the wrongly convicted shows that they too are subject to
constitutional attack in the courts of states where they have been
enacted. Much like the noneconomic damages cap, wrongful
conviction damage caps segregate the wrongly convicted into groups
based upon the severity of the injury. The burden of the cap falls
most heavily on those most severely injured because they are
ineligible to receive an award above the statutory limit, which
exposes them to gross imdercompensation. On the other hand,
individuals less injured, such as those only remaining behind bars
for a short period, will likely receive full compensation for their
injuries. Furthermore, the legislative cap eliminates the judicial
power of remittitur by legislatively deciding the maximum amount
of compensation allowable under any set of circumstances and also
intrudes upon a jury's ability to determine the extent of damages a
claimant should receive. Thus, the statutory damage caps on
compensation for the wrongly convicted implicate the same special
legislation and separation-of-powers concerns that other courts have
used to strike down other damages recovery caps.
While damage caps are susceptible to constitutional attack,
mounting assaults against them with an eye toward future enact-
ment of unlimited recovery statutes could prove costly even if
successful. States have no legal obligation to compensate victims of
wrongful convictions.24 If a court declares compensatory legislation
unconstitutional, a state could react by simply refusing to enact a
different remedial statute. Thus, rather than benefitting the
wrongfully accused, overturning compensatory legislation on
constitutional grounds could leave no avenue of redress other than
a lawsuit against a state actor with all of its associated difficulty.'"
Although states have no legal obligation to remedy the injuries
of the wrongly convicted, legal precedent is not the only basis upon
which states grant compensation to innocent individuals who suffer
severe injuries. Between 1954 and 1992, many states enacted
24" Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CFH.
L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 92 n.78 (1999) (asserting attempts to find legal basis for indemnifica-
tion have been unsuccessful).
2" Seesupranotes 147-87 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy ofstatutory and
common law remedies for unjust convictions).
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legislation for "the protection and assistance of victims of crime and
members of the immediate families of such victims in order to
preserve the individual dignity of victims."245  These statutes,
generally referred to as Crime Victims' Compensation Statutes,
financially aid innocent victims of crimes and their families because
they may "suffer disabilities, incur financial hardships, or become
dependent upon public assistance" as a result of the crime.246
Despite having no legal obligation to provide monetary compensa-
tion for innocent victims of criminal acts, some state legislatures
found a moral responsibility to assist innocent victims of crime.247
The moral compass articulated by state legislators in the
legislative purpose of crime victims' compensation statutes suggests
that there may exist at least an aspirational willingness to enact
improved statutory compensation schemes for the wrongly con-
victed. Yet, in light of the awards to victims of false imprisonment,
the moral and political balance of interests struck by state legisla-
tors and embodied in the statutory limits on payments to wrongly
convicted persons cannot be considered anything but "a highhanded
insult to an almost inconceivable injury." '248 If society benefits by the
incarceration of guilty criminals, then society bears the burden of
compensating a person unjustly incarcerated as a result of mistakes
made by its criminaljustice machine and its state actors. Moreover,
many states spread out the cost of hardship on the private individ-
ual by recognizing a "moral" obligation, as opposed to a legal
obligation, to compensate persons who suffered injuries at the hands
of private individuals.249 In comparison, the moral obligation of the
24 E.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-101 (West 2001).
2 6 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 960.02 (Harrison 1998).
" The crime victims' compensation statute in Wisconsin, for example, emphasizes that
its legislature "finds and declares that the state has a moral responsibility to aid innocent
victims of violent crime." WIs. STAT. § 949.001 (1996). Similarly, the Florida legislature
found that "aid, care, and support be provided by the state, as a matter of moral responsibil-
ity, for such victims of adult and juvenile crime." FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 960.02; see also, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-802(b) (2001) (terming justification moral responsibility);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1998) (terming justification "a matter of grace"); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-368.1 (Michie 2000) (same).
248 Hoffner v. State, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 630, 631 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955).
249 See Bernhard, supra note 243, at 97-101 (comparing obligations of crime victim's
compensation statutes to those of statutory compensation for wrongly convicted and arguing
passage of former despite objections demonstrates objections to latter are generally
unfounded).
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state to indemnify the unjustly convicted person and spread out the
cost of the harm inflicted is at least equivalent if not greater in cases
of wrongful conviction because it is the failure of the state itself that
damaged the victim. Even if state actors display no malice or
negligence, it is still the state and its legislatively chosen procedures
in lieu of others designed to prevent wrongful convictions, such as
mandatory DNA testing, that injures the unjustly convicted. As a
result, our collective sense of social and moral justice demands that
the balance between political interest and compensation for the
wrongly convicted be better weighed. In the end,
compensation responds to an elementary demand for
justice harbored in every human breast. Just as that
demand is satisfied by the conviction of the guilty, so
it required the acquittal of the innocent. When, then,
by a misguided or mistaken operation of the govern-
mental machine there is a miscarriage of justice and
the helpless innocent is actually convicted, the public
conscience is and ought to be revolted and dismayed.
The least the community can do to repair the irrepa-
rable is to appease the public conscience by making
such restitution as it can by indemnity."'
Given their similar underpinnings, the natural approach to
compensating the wrongly convicted would be to apply the remedial
standards associated with crime victims' compensation statutes.
However, crime victims' compensatory schemes cannot be applied
with precision to the wrongly convicted in part because they do not
provide compensation for pain and suffering. For example, the
crime victims' compensation statute in Kansas explicitly states that
"noneconomic detriment is not loss" and defines "noneconomic
detriment" to include pain and suffering." 1 The absence of a
See BORCHARD, supra note 26, at 392.
251 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7301(i),G) (1992); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-109(2)(a)
(2001) (providing compensable losses do not include pain and suffering); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5 § 3360(4) (West 1964, Supp. 2000) (requiring damages "must be expenses or losses
actually and reasonably incurred"); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODEANN. § 56.34 (Vernon Supp. 2000)
(referring only to "pecuniary loss"); WIS. STAT. § 949.06 (1996) (allowing recovery only for
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compensatory sum for pain and suffering for the wrongly convicted
would leave them without redress for one of their most severe
injuries. As a result, compensation for the wrongly convicted
requires alternative schemes that are capable of providing more
equitable relief.
Recognizing the prevalence of statutory limitations provides a
foundation from which to create a reformed statutory schedule of
compensation that better balances the competing interests of
legislators and the wrongly convicted. Rather than placing an upper
limit upon total statutory compensation, a more equitable approach
would be to compartmentalize the remedy according to the type of
injury suffered and place a monetary damages limit on specific types
of injuries in a manner similar to those applied to damages claims
in other areas of law. As a general matter, the injuries suffered by
the wrongly convicted because of their undeserved fate can be
divided into economic and noneconomic damages, each of which
must be accounted for in the remedy. Economic damages are those
that remedy any monetary detriment to the individual as a result of
the injury such as lost wages or medical expenses.252 Noneconomic
damages are those that remedy nonfinancial injuries such as pain
and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, physical impairment,
loss of capacity to enjoy life, loss of reputation, or loss of consortium,
which may be substantial for the wrongfully accused.25 By dividing
the remedy into economic and noneconomic dimensions, a workable
framework emerges from which to address compensation for the
unjustly convicted that comprehensively redresses a victim's injuries
and stands in stark contrast with the flat caps present in most
current statutes.
The first prong, compensation for economic damages, is indis-
pensable to the calculation because a wrongful conviction and
economic loss).
252 E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-3(11) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(a) (1991); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 766.202(3) (Harrison 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-2(10) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §
18.560(2)(a) (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-3A-1 (Michie 1987); WASH. REV. CODE §
4.56.250(1)(a) (1988).
2 E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-3(12) (1975); ALASKASTAT. § 9.17.010(a) (Michie 2000); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(a) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. 766.202(7) (Harrison 1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.560(2)(b) (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3A-1 (Michie 19887); WASH. REV. CODE §
4.56.250(1)(b) (1988).
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incarceration creates an undeniable financial detriment to the
individual. In many cases, the most significant economic damage
will be recovery for lost wages as a result of the wrongful conviction
and incarceration. Allowing recovery for lost wages is reasonable
because, but for an erroneous conviction, a wrongly convicted person
who was employed prior to the injustice would have earned wages
during the period of incarceration.254 Michael Ray Graham Jr., to
use but one example, worked in the construction business as a roofer
in Virginia prior to his wrongful conviction in Louisiana."' If not for
the fourteen years Graham unjustly spent in a Louisiana prison,
Graham would have continued to earn his wages as a roofer." 6 In
addition to the financial detriment occasioned by a loss of wages, a
wrongful conviction and incarceration potentially creates medical
expenses that should be recoverable as economic damages. For
example, the trauma caused by an extended unjust imprisonment
may result in psychological damage that requires counseling or
treatment from a medical professional. In sum, the economic
damages prong would compensate the wrongly convicted for all
tangible injuries associated with the incarceration, whether prior to
or following release from prison.
Considering the nature of economic damages, a monetary limit on
recovery is unnecessary because a natural cap exists to preclude
overcompensation. A claimant is limited to what she can factually
prove as being the financial losses attributable to the unjust
conviction and incarceration. In other words, one cannot obtain an
award greater than what the evidence shows. Moreover, the limits
of evidentiary proof bring an equitable quality to the economic
damages inquiry because the claimant who suffers and proves
greater injuries will receive greater compensation. If a claimant did
not have a job prior to conviction, the evidence will demonstrate that
fact, and the claimant will be unable to recover any money for lost
wages. Any other result would be a windfall for the unemployed
claimant in economic terms despite the gross injustice of a wrongful
' Assuming that the wrongly convicted person would have labored at the same job for
the duration of the incarceration. While one might have switched jobs if the wrongful
incarceration is lengthy, such a change is far too speculative for remedial purposes.
See Rimer, supra note 24.
SId.
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conviction. Thus, in the evidentiary world, monetary detriment as
a result of lost wages or medical expenses is a finite and identifiable
sum provable by reference to concrete evidence, and any cap on
recovery would be arbitrary in every sense of the word.
In contrast to the calculation of economic damages, appropriate
compensation for noneconomic damages for pain and suffering,
humiliation, or the like cannot be determined solely by reference to
objective factors. According to the California Supreme Court, "[n]o
method is available to the jury by which it can objectively evaluate
such damages, and no witness may express his subjective opinion on
the matter."257 To assist juries in their conversion of noneconomic
injuries into dollars, the codes of many states contain provisions
capping recovery of noneconomic damages for a variety of tort
claims. California, for example, caps recovery for noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions at $250,000.25' Even more
broadly, some states employ caps on noneconomic damages in any
civil action seeking compensation for noneconomic injuries. For
example, Maryland caps recovery for noneconomic damages in any
personal injury action at $350,000.259 Furthermore, some states
utilize comprehensive caps that broadly limit recovery against
governmental entities, which includes compensation for
noneconomic injuries. For example, the laws of both Delaware and
South Carolina limit the liability of any governmental entity for any
act or omission to $300,000.260 In sum, legislatively enacted caps on
" Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. 1966).
2' CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-14-7.1(1)(b) (1996 & Supp.
2001). See also MONT. CODEANN. § 25-9-411 (2001) (applying $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice actions); WIS. STAT. § 893.55-(4)(d) (1997) (capping
noneconomic recovery in medical malpractice actions at $350,000); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8
(2000) (applying $1,000,000 cap on noneconomic recovery in medical malpractice actions).
2 MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JuD. PRoc. § 11-108(b) (1998). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
21-102.5(3)(a) (1997) (capping recovery for noneconomic injuries in any civil action at
$250,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994) (limiting noneconomic recovery to $250,000);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(i) (1988) (capping noneconomic damages in civil action at $500,000).
260 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4013 (1999) (limiting recovery to $300,000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-6105 (1989) (limiting governmental liability to total of $500,000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14 § 8105 (West 1964 & Supp. 1999) (capping recovery at $400,000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
466.04 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (capping noneconomic recovery from municipal body at $1
million for claims arising after January 1, 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (Law Co-op.
1976 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Michie 1978) (limiting recovery to $1.5
million).
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noneconomic injury awards provide a frame of reference for
evaluating intangible damages in various settings while reducing
the legislative fear of gross overcompensation.
Although noneconomic injuries associated with other wrongful
acts can be severe, such as harm from medical malpractice, they are
no more injurious to their victims than those accompanying a
wrongful conviction are to the innocent person. The pain of being
unjustly ripped away from family members, the damage to one's
reputation, the mental anguish of knowing that one is innocent yet
imprisoned, and the permanent impact on one's future are each at
least as incalculable as any other noneconomic injury. As a result,
legislatures cannot rationally limit the awards for one type incalcu-
lable harm at an abysmally low level while providing a higher
amount of compensation for another type of incalculable harm. In
fact, the wrongly convicted arguably deserve greater compensation
than other individuals suffering similar harms because their
injuries occur at the hands of the state and its agents. Regardless,
the wrongly convicted deserve the opportunity to recoup at least as
much compensation as is provided to remedy other noneconomic
injuries.
Given that other noneconomic damages caps redress injuries just
as indeterminable as those associated with the wrongly convicted,
utilizing one of those caps to limit compensation for the wrongly
convicted is a more rational and acceptable limit on recovery in
comparison to the shockingly low caps used in current schemes.
Most readily applicable are those caps that limit recovery for
noneconomic injuries associated with personal injury torts. For
example, instead of recovering a paltry $10,000 lump sum from
California, a wrongly convicted person would have the opportunity
to obtain up to $250,000, the limit for noneconomic damages
associated with medical malpractice claims.26' Absent an analogous
limit on noneconomic injuries for medical malpractice claims,
general caps limiting recovery for noneconomic injuries in any civil
action provide another applicable limit on compensation for the
wrongly convicted because a claim of wrongful conviction is a civil
claim. In contrast to its statutory compensation of actual damages
21 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
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for the wrongly convicted, Maryland limits recovery for noneconomic
damages in any other civil action to $500,000.262
If a state code contains neither of the previous two limitations
but has a limit on damages recoverable from a governmental entity
that includes noneconomic damages, it would be a more rational,
albeit arbitrary, limit in comparison to the grossly
undercompensating caps within current statutes. As a result, a
state without a compensatory statute to redress the injuries of the
wrongly convicted, such as Kansas, could enact a statute that
limited total recovery for noneconomic damages to $500,000, which
is the limit for noneconomic recovery from a governmental entity in
Kansas.26 Indeed, a cap on damages recoverable from a governmen-
tal body arguably applies with the greatest force because it is the
state that inflicts the harm on the wrongly convicted. Whatever cap
a state chooses to utilize, the reformed limit on recovery for
noneconomic harm serves as a rational companion to the self-
limiting cap associated with economic damages arising from the
wrongful conviction.
To calibrate the recoverable noneconomic damages to the severity
of the crime, the proposed remedial statute incorporates a schedule
of allowable compensation that varies with the classification of the
crime for which one unjustly served time. For example, Kansas
utilizes a sentencing framework that categorizes felonies and
punishments according to their adjudged severity using a scale that
varies from I to X in conjunction with the criminal history of the
offender.264 While first degree murder is considered an "off-grid"
crime and exposes an individual to the death penalty or life
imprisonment, 65 convicting an individual with no prior criminal
record of a severity level I crime, such as murder in the second
degree,266 presumptively would result in a sentence of 97 months in
prison."' For the sake of comparison, rape can be a level II severity
crime and comes with a presumptive sentence of 73 months in
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1998).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105 (1989).
264 Id. § 21-4704 (1995 & Supp. 1999) (applying to crimes committed after July 1, 1993).
2 Id. § 21-4706 (1995).
Id. § 21-3402 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
267 Id. § 21-4704.
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prison for someone with no prior criminal history.268 Although their
codes differ in their approaches to sentencing convicted criminals,
states uniformly vary punishment with the severity of the crime.269
By grafting the legislatively selected cap on noneconomic
damages onto the sentencing guidelines for a given state and
determining a range of sums available, a framework for
noneconomic compensation can be constructed that varies with the
severity of the punishment to which the state imposed upon the
unjustly convicted person. At the upper end of the schedule of
compensation would be the sums allotted to those falsely convicted
of the most severe crimes. For example, the range of noneconomic
recovery for persons wrongly convicted of "off-grid" crimes in
Kansas, which carry punishments of life imprisonment or death,
could be legislatively designated to be between $400,000 and
$500,000 with the upper bound reflecting the limit of compensation
borrowed from the selected noneconomic damages cap. 270 The
proposed schedule would then compensate all categories of crimes
for which victims suffer wrongful convictions in decreasing amounts.
Crimes of lesser severity likely entail a lesser degree of
noneconomic harm; therefore, a lesser sum of money is required to
compensate for those injuries. For example, it is worse to be falsely
convicted of murder than it is to be wrongly convicted of theft.
Continuing to use Kansas as an example, then, the schedule could
provide between $350,000 and $400,000 for false convictions of
severity level I crimes, between $300,000 and $350,000 for errone-
ous convictions of severity level II crimes, and so on with diminish-
ing differences in the ranges of available compensation as the
severity scale decreases."' In the end, each individual wrongly
convicted of a crime at the hands of state actors receives compensa-
tion for noneconomic injuries commensurate with the severity of the
m Id. §§ 21-3502, 21-4704.
2'9 See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (1998 & Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.14 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.04 (Vernon 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A-505 (1998 & Supp. 2002).
270 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105.
27 For example, the difference in noneconomic damage between a false conviction for a
severity level X felony and a severity level IX felony is unlikely to be vast. As a result,
statutory compensation for a level X felony could be between $1-$5,000 while that for a level
IX felony could be between $5,000-$10,000.
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criminal penalty imposed or projected, such as death in capital
cases.
In a structural sense, calculating noneconomic compensation
using a sliding scale of this nature simply mirrors the schemes
many states utilize to pay court-appointed attorneys.272 In Alabama,
for example, court-appointed attorneys receive compensation that
varies with the severity of the defendant's crime. Court-appointed
attorneys representing persons charged with Class A felonies under
Alabama law may receive no more than $3,500 for their work,
attorneys representing people charged with Class B felonies may
receive no more than $2,500, and so on.273 Other states vary their
compensatory sums according to the severity of the defendant's
potential penalty. Florida's schedule of compensation for court-
appointed counsel allows for a maximum of $3,500 for attorneys
whose clients are at risk of capital punishment and the lesser sum
of $3,000 for attorneys representing clients who could receive life
sentences. 4 In light of their experience with other compensatory
schedules that vary with criminal severity, the proposed schedule
for noneconomic compensation provides a ready-made formula that
is both easy for state legislatures to enact and for courts to imple-
ment.
Not only does this step-wise schedule of diminishing compensa-
tion equitably remedy noneconomic injuries, but it also preserves a
more meaningful role for the jury, the body charged with determin-
ing the damages owed to an individual claimant. A flat, low
statutory cap on noneconomic recovery directs the jury to bestow a
full recovery on a given claimant in light of the egregious nature of
the prison experience. On the other hand, the possibility of an
overall higher recovery combined with a range of compensatory
sums allows a jury to more closely scrutinize the particular injuries
suffered by a given claimant and tailor a remedy to suit. Even
claimants falsely convicted of crimes of equal severity in terms of
272 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2604(b) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-5(b) (1993); IOWA
CODE § 815.7 (1994 & Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.125(2) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 604-A.5 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50(A) (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-32-304.5(f) (1999).
27 ALA. CODE §§ 15-12-21(d)(1)-(6) (1995 & Supp. 2000).
274 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 925.036(2)(c)-(d) (Harrison 1998).
718 [Vol. 36:665
2002] COMPENSATION OF THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 719
sentencing guidelines may have differences in their noneconomic
injuries. For example, the injury to a banker's reputation and
future job prospects as a result of a false theft conviction is likely to
be greater than that of a truck driver. The range of available
compensatory sums contemplates such differences within categories
of crime of equal severity and allows the jury to adjust compensation
accordingly. Ultimately, the range of dollar amounts associated
with the schedule of compensation gives the trier of fact the
opportunity to individualize the remedy,
Combining the economic and noneconomic damages obtainable
under the proposed statutory scheme represents a balance that
more closely approaches the "middle of the road" between the
interests of legislators and those of the wrongly convicted than is
provided by the majority of current statutory compensation
provisions. This revised compensatory approach could serve as a
model both for reform in states with low caps and for initial
enactment in states without any statutory compensation scheme.
To assuage the budgetary concerns of state legislators, the proposal
contains factual or rational caps on damages thereby limiting the
total liability of the state. Indeed, the noneconomic damages
compensatory strategy contains multiple caps that vary with the
severity of the crime of the erroneously convicted and the maximum
recoverable amount is only available to individuals subjected to the
most severe penalties. In theory, the total amount of recoverable
damages remains infinite in light of the unlimited amount obtain-
able for economic damages. In reality, however, the amount of
economic compensation will be low because most defendants are
either indigent or work at low paying jobs prior to their wrongful
convictions. As a result, the proposal adds a measure of predictabil-
ity to the amount of liability that a state is likely to incur in any
given case.
Even if state legislators fear the possibility of unlimited recovery
from an unlimited number of claimants, they nevertheless retain
the legislative ability to restrict access to the statutory remedy by
increasing the burden of proof from a preponderance of the evidence
to clear and convincing evidence. However, experience demon-
strates that the number of successful claimants will be small
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regardless of the amount of available compensation.27 5 For example,
New York has granted recovery in only six of sixty-two claims filed
between 1984 and 1999 despite having one of the most liberal
compensation statutes in the nation.276 Similarly, West Virginia,
whose 1987 statute is the mirror image of the New York compensa-
tory scheme, had paid a mere two claims as of 1999.277 Although the
proposed scheme is more restrictive than the New York or West
Virginia provisions in that it limits compensation, it nonetheless
represents a demonstrably greater commitment to moral and
compensatory justice on the part of state legislators without
severely threatening to impact the state budget.
This proposed compensation scheme is also more just from the
perspective of the wrongly convicted because it provides them with
more money from which to begin their lives anew. The wrongly
convicted deserve greater compensation not only because of the
injustice of wrongful imprisonment, but also because their ordeals
forever alter their lives regardless of later exoneration. Not only
will a wrongly convicted person forever face questions about his true
innocence of the crime, but he will also encounter everyday hard-
ships while trying to resume his life outside of prison. For example,
many job applications contain a question about the criminal history
of the applicant. The wrongly convicted person must at least admit
to being arrested and may have to reveal that he was convicted. 8
Explaining that the state wrongly convicted him and made repara-
tions is be no easy task. Even if an explanation is articulated and
accepted by a potential employer, the wrongly convicted person faces
a competitive workplace with no employment history, no recent
references, and a lack of technical skills frequently required to
perform many jobs in our computerized society. 9 In this light, the
most damaging injury inflicted upon the wrongly convicted is not
" See Higgins, supra note 43, at 48-49 (compiling survey of claims and award amounts
in 1999 revealing that recently, all 16 jurisdictions with statutory compensation have paid
total of only 49 claims).
276 Id. at 49.
277 Id.
278 C.J. Chivers, Long Wait for DNA Result Can Be Justice Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2000, § 1, at 49 (reporting difficulties finding employment of one wrongly convicted person).
" See Donna J. Robb, Wrongly Convicted Man Struggles to Rebuild His Life, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 1, 2001, at B3 (providing one case history).
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necessarily the time lost behind bars, but the stigma that follows
them for the rest of their lives. Greater compensation not only
redresses the damage directly associated with incarceration, but
also eases the radical transition to freedom and all of its conse-
quences. For example, using awards granted according to a liberal
scheme for comparison, New York awarded $750,000 to Willie
Fisher after serving an eleven-year prison sentence 80 and $766,000
to J.L. Ivey after a five-year incarceration for murders each did not
commit.
V. CONCLUSION
On a fundamental level, remedies implement the substantive
policies embraced by society. Within the confines of our society and
the treatment of its criminals, "the fundamental value determina-
tion of the American criminal justices system [is] that it is far worse
to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty person go free."28'
Given the meager compensatory sums of money allotted as alms to
the wrongly convicted by the state, the "fundamental value" is a dog
with little to no bite and possesses only symbolic meaning on the
cold pages of old books. Instead of putting its money where its
mouth is, society at this point apparently prefers to quell its fear of
crime regardless of the cost to innocent individuals. As evidence of
the lack of concern over the plight of the wrongly convicted, one
need look no further than to the meager amounts that states offer
exonerated individuals who unjustly waste portions of their lives
behind bars for crimes they did not commit. Michael Ray Graham
Jr. spent fourteen years of his life in prison for a crime he did not
commit. For his troubles, he received ten dollars for transportation
home and a coat from the state upon his release from prison.
Convicting the innocent serves no socially-redeeming purpose.
Regardless of any sense of moral justice, the truly guilty remain free
to commit crimes and often continue to do so at the expense of the
innocently imprisoned.
o PeterKerr, Man Who Was Wrongly Jailed in Slaying isAwarded $750,000, N.Y.TmEs,
Jan. 14, 1986, at B2.
"1 People v. Bull, 705 N.E.2d 824, 842 (Ill. 1998).
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Although placing a dollar value on the loss of liberty illustrates
one of the worst problems in the law, refusing to enact equitable
compensatory statutes or adhering to statutes that grossly
undercompensate the wrongly convicted inflicts yet another wound
upon the wrongly convicted. Indeed, "[t]he greatest crime of all in
a civilized society is an unjust conviction. It is truly a scandal that
reflects unfavorably on all participants in the criminal justice
system."282 As a result, the severity of the injuries inflicted upon the
wrongly convicted demand increased compensation through
improved remedial approaches. Dividing the damages of the
unjustly convicted into economic and noneconomic with associated
caps that reflect the political reality of the legislative environment
suits the interests of both state legislators and the wrongly con-
victed. State legislators avoid having monstrously large verdicts
that impair state budgets while appearing to be concerned with the
cause of social justice. The wrongly convicted avoid the alarmingly
low compensatory sums awarded under most current compensatory
frameworks. By seeking a middle ground between the interests of
both camps, the statutory schedule of compensation puts a few teeth
back into the bite of a time-honored fundamental value of our
criminal justice system and acknowledges that convicting the
innocent is not just the stuff of "unreal" dreams.
212 Dennis Hevesi, Overturning Conviction is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, § 1, at
25 (quoting appellate court that upheld overturning rape conviction of Alberto Ramos).
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